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26 March 1985

# West Europe Report

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26 March 1985

## WEST EUROPE REPORT

## CONTENTS

## POLITICAL

## EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

- Regional Balance Seen Unaffected by Papandreou Moscow Visit  
(Ergun Balci; CUMHURIYET, 25 Feb 85)..... 1
- French, Germans Polled on Reunification Issues  
(GEOPOLITIQUE, Winter 84-85)..... 3

## AUSTRIA

- Extreme Rightist Tendencies in Freedom Party  
(Inge Santner; DIE WELTWOCH, 31 Jan 85)..... 7

## BELGIUM

- Deprez Defends His Leadership of Walloon Social Christians  
(Gerard Deprez Interview; LA LIBRE BELGIQUE, 7 Feb 85)..... 10

## CYPRUS

- Archbishop, DISY Leader Clash on Policies  
(O FILELEVTHROS, 15, 16 Feb 85)..... 15
- Kliridis Attack  
Archbishop's Reply
- Informal Poll on Kyprianou Policy  
(O FILELEVTHROS, 15 Feb 85)..... 17

## DENMARK

- Left Socialist Party Group Revolts Over Afghanistan Policy  
(Peter Eriksen; INFORMATION, 8 Feb 85)..... 18

## FRANCE

PCF Federal Conferences Reveal Significant Opposition (Eric Dupin; LIBERATION, 22 Jan 85).....	22
Karlin Discusses PCF Militant Concerns About Party (Daniel Karlin, Tony Laine; L'HUMANITE, 14 Jan 85).....	24
Gains Seen for UDF During Past Year (Olivier Pognon; LE FIGARO, 29/30 Dec 84).....	26

## ICELAND

Polls Show Declining Support for Coalition Parties, Government (MORGUNBLADID, 6, 7 Mar 85).....	29
People's Alliance Suffers Setback Support for Government Drops	

## PORTUGAL

Salgueiro Group Looks Again to Firmino Miguel (EXPRESSO, 16 Feb 85).....	32
Government Crisis: Victories for Soares (Jose Antonio Saraiva; EXPRESSO, 16 Feb 85).....	34
Pintasilgo in Presidential Race to Stay (SEMANARIO, 16 Feb 85).....	36
Political Outlook Said Pessimistic (Manuel Maria Murias; O DIABO, 19 Feb 85).....	37
Poll: Communism Poor Model for Portugal (Nuno Cintra Torres; DIARIO DE NOTICIAS, 24 Feb 85).....	39
Poll: Increasingly Qualified PSD Majority (SEMANARIO, 16 Feb 85).....	44
Recent CDS Congress Assessed: Moreira Stronger (Fernando Diogo; DIARIO DE NOTICIAS, 25 Feb 85).....	48

## SWEDEN

Vayrynen's Comments on Soviet Sub Incursions Viewed (Editorial; SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 12 Jan 85).....	50
---	----

## TURKEY

Ankara Note Focuses on Plight of Bulgarian Turks (CUMHURIYET, 25 Feb 85).....	52
--	----



## MILITARY

### BELGIUM

- Proposed Military Budget for 1985 Detailed  
(LA LIBRE BELGIQUE, 13 Feb 85)..... 54

### DENMARK

- Antinuclear Weapons Group Wants U.S. Fleet Visit Guarantees  
(INFORMATION, 12 Feb 85)..... 57

### FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

- Woerner Reviews Problems of Manpower, Armaments, Cooperation  
(Manfred Woerner Interview; WEHRTECHNIK, Feb 85)..... 58

### GREECE

- 'Pre-Electoral' Officer's Pay Increase  
(I VRADYNI, 9 Feb 85)..... 67
- Greek Readiness Against Turkish Attack Emphasized  
(St. Kalogeropoulou; ETHNOS, 10 Feb 85)..... 68

### SWEDEN

- JAS Getting Unique Domestically Designed Control System  
(Sven Olof Carlsson, Mikael Holmstrom; NY TEKNIK,  
22 Nov 84)..... 72

## ECONOMIC

### DENMARK/GREENLAND

- Large Deposit of Wolfram Found on Island  
(FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG/BLICK DURCH DIE WIRTSCHAFT,  
25 Jan 85)..... 81

### GREECE

- Spectrum of Trade With USSR Reviewed  
(Mikh. Papagiannakis; TO VIMA, 10 Feb 85)..... 83
- Industrial, Mining Production Rose in 1984  
(TO VIMA, 12 Feb 85)..... 87

ENERGY

GREECE

- Oil Exploration Seen Steadily Decreasing  
(And. Zisimatos; MESIMVRINI, 9 Feb 85)..... 89

SWEDEN

- Briefs  
Oil Search on Gotland 91

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

SWEDEN

- Communist MP, Industry Spokesman Criticizes Environment Bill  
(DAGENS NYHETER, 27 Feb 85)..... 92

POLITICAL

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

REGIONAL BALANCE SEEN UNAFFECTED BY PAPANDREOU MOSCOW VISIT

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 25 Feb 85 p 3

[Article by Ergun Balci in the column "Problems of Policy": "Soviet-Greek Rapprochement and Turkey"]

[Text] Is the Greek-Soviet rapprochement highlighted by Andreas Papandreou's trip to Moscow important?

If you ask us, it is not very important.

Don't misunderstand. In saying that it is not important, we are trying to say that it is not of a nature to lead to change in Turkey's interests and the Turkish-Soviet-Greek balance.

We do not think, actually, that Moscow takes Papandreou's pronouncements very seriously either. Thus we do not believe that a stance to encourage Greece on the 12-mile issue was taken by the Kremlin behind closed doors during the Greek prime minister's visit or will be taken henceforward.

True, there may be a certain logic in Moscow's setting Turkey and Greece to quarreling and going along itself. But important decisions in the Kremlin are not made according to this kind of easy logic that immediately comes to mind. One must not forget that the Soviet leaders are extremely deliberate and formulate foreign policy on a long-term basis, not according to short-term interests.

From this standpoint, even if Papandreou were to have given the Soviet leaders all kinds of assurances behind closed doors in Moscow on the 12-mile issue, guaranteeing their ships free passage, the first problem that would most likely have occurred to the Kremlin leaders would have been: "This friend may be guaranteeing that he will grant every right of passage to our ships when territorial waters in the Aegean are extended to 12 miles. But what will happen when he is no longer in power and if he is replaced by a conservative government? Will that government give us the same guarantee?"

Moreover, Moscow is very well aware of the limitations on the socialism (!) of Papandreou. One of the limitations on this socialism is the Greek army. Papandreou has, it seems, ousted the pro-junta men from the army, but he has been unable to rid the armed forces of conservative officers. Another limitation on

the Greek prime minister's socialism is the Greek bourgeoisie, which rules key points of the economy. Although the Greek prime minister has frozen labor wages, he has not meddled with the bourgeoisie.

The Kremlin leaders are experienced enough to appreciate properly the socialism and anti-imperialism of the Greek prime minister, who is careful not to go against the interests of capital, who retains right-wing officers in the army and keeps the American bases.

So, Moscow pats Papandreou on the back and welcomes him warmly, but, if you ask us, is not going to commit itself to the Greek prime minister in such a way as to alter the regional balance. For the Soviets to adopt a stance encouraging Greece on the 12-mile issue would mean reversing foreign policy tradition to push long-term interests aside and allow short-term interests to dominate. The Soviets' long-term interests, however, lie in the continuation of friendly relations with Turkey.

Another question comes to mind at this point: "Since a Greece-Turkish war would cause the collapse of the southeastern flank of NATO, wouldn't it suit the interests of the Soviets?"

We do not really think Moscow would consider a Greek-Turkish war in the most volatile region of the world, in its own and Bulgaria's backyard, to be in its interest. No one can be certain of how far the flames ignited by such a war would spread, what kind of upheaval would be spurred in the Balkans where almost every country has an historic territorial dispute with another, or who would be dragged into the crisis.

We do not think that either of the two super powers wants a deep disturbance in the other bloc. Disturbances on this scale can influence their own bloc or lead to developments that would drag their own bloc into the crisis.

The United States, for example, most likely does not want an armed confrontation between East Germany and Poland which have no love for each other. A crisis of this dimension could spread to West Germany, and an intra-bloc clash could become an inter-bloc provocation.

We think it may be said that the same concerns hold true for the Soviet leaders as well.

Strange as it may seem, the two super powers do not want the balance between them to be upset significantly against either side. If this were to happen, the side against which the balance shifted would retaliate. For example, if Moscow were to incite Turkey and Greece to war to bring collapse of the southeastern flank of NATO, it knows the United States would destabilize East Germany or Poland, for example, in Europe. We do not think, therefore, that Soviet-Greek rapprochement would lead to Moscow's taking a position to offend Turkey, with which it has common interests in the Aegean.

NEWSWEEK reports in its latest issue that Papandreou's anti-Turkish talk at the Kremlin caused consternation among the Soviet leaders. If one recalls that the Soviets have to be mindful of the delicate balances in the Middle East and keeps in mind Turkey's role in this balance with both its 50-million population and strategic location, one can easily see cause for the Kremlin leaders' consternation.

POLITICAL

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

FRENCH, GERMANS POLLED ON REUNIFICATION ISSUES

Paris GEOPOLITIQUE in French Winter 84-85 pp 6-9

[Gallup International Group poll conducted in France by Faits et Opinions from 13 to 14 December 1984 among a national representative sampling of 809 persons 18 years old and over, and in the Federal Republic of Germany by the EMNID Institute from 4 to 6 December 1984 among a representative sampling of 535 persons 18 years old and over]

[Text] Will Reunification Take Place?

Do you think that Germany will eventually be reunified?

Response of French:	<u>1984</u>	
Yes	12% }	36%
Probably	24 }	
Probably Not	25 }	45%
No	20 }	
No Opinion	19	

Response of Germans:	<u>1953</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	
Yes	18%	2%	2%	4% }	11%
Probably	25	7	5	7 }	
Probably Not	36	32	33	33 }	89%
No	16	53	60	56 }	
No Opinion	5	6	--	--	

Is Reunification Desired in the West?

Personally, do you hope that the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic will be reunified?

Response of French:		Response of Germans:	
Yes	62%	Yes	73%
No	21	No	26
No Opinion	17	No Opinion	1

Do you think that the West Germans are in favor of or are opposed to reunification?

Response of French:

In Favor	50%
Opposed	12
No Opinion	38

Is Reunification Desired in the East?

Do you think that the East Germans are in favor of or are opposed to reunification?

Response of French:

In Favor	51%
Opposed	11
No Opinion	38

Response of Germans:

In Favor	76%
Opposed	22
No Opinion	2

Is Reunification Dangerous for France and Europe?

Do you think that, for France, German reunification would result in more advantages than disadvantages, or in more disadvantages than advantages?

Response of French:

More Advantages	38%
More Disadvantages	26
No Opinion	36

Do you think that German reunification would endanger the existence of the European Community?

Response of French:

Yes	20%
No	55
No Opinion	25

Priority for the West?

In your opinion, which is most important: German reunification or the FRG's being part of the Western world?

Response of French:

FRG's Being Part of Western World	40%
Reunification of Germany	31
No Opinion	29

Response of Germans:

FRG's Being Part of Western World	57%
Reunification of Germany	41
No Opinion	2

## The Price To Be Paid

If German reunification were to result in the neutralization of Germany and Western Europe, do you think that the West Germans would be prepared to accept it?

### Response of French:

Yes	27%
No	34
No Opinion	39

If German reunification were to result in the neutralization of Germany and Western Europe, would you be prepared to accept it?

### Response of Germans:

Yes	67%
No	31
No Opinion	2

If German reunification were to result in a political system, in your country, which was closer to that of socialist countries, with less freedom than today, would you be prepared to accept it?

### Response of Germans:

Yes	11%
No	88
No Opinion	1

## Reunification Through Ostpolitik?

In your opinion, has Ostpolitik, which has been practiced for about a decade, increased the chances for German reunification?

### Response of Germans:

Yes	28%
No	71
No Opinion	1

## Motivations of German Pacifism

In your opinion, does the development of pacifist movements in the FRG correspond to ...

Response of Germans:	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
The will to preserve national German identity?	26%	68%	6%
A disappointment with Western values?	37	57	6
Fear of war?	84	13	3



Germany as European Space Leader?

Do you want to see the FRG play a leading role in a European manned space station program?

Response of French:

Yes	31%
No	37
No Opinion	32

Response of Germans:

Yes	63%
No	36
No Opinion	1

11915

CSO: 3519/157

POLITICAL

EXTREME RIGHTIST TENDENCIES IN FREEDOM P

Zurich DIE WELTWOCHE in German 31 Jan 85

[Article by Inge Santner: "The FPÖ--Lib Frischenschlager Gaffe Awakens Recollect Chancellor Sinowatz"]

[Text] Foreign countries had good reason defense minister, Friedhelm Frischenschlager, who had just been released from prison, met him personally at Graz-Thalerhof Air

lead articles of various colorations askable that a member of the cabinet of doubt such a step which is tantamount to justice though Frischenschlager had slapped the bannführer in the face. How was something possible?

In Austria, on the other hand, the surprise of the political scene had to figure sooner or later. After all, it is known the small Freedom Party and that this FPÖ, typically German, not to say Nazi-like in have puzzled over the fact as to why it would be responsible for this embarrassing known to be one of the most liberal figures

Bogus Man From Vienna

The dilemma for the Freedom Party which, a relative plenty of power as a coalition Party of Austria) and has even more position the so-called "third force" in the turbulent The FPÖ predecessor party, the VDU (Verband Independente) was established in 1949 and former national socialists"--of the approximately 650,000. The party drew its national movement of the 19th century. among the prisoners of the postwar Nazi

released earlier than their term. FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU later quite aptly reported that "the leadership accounted for 300 years of imprisonment."

Grotesquely, the new party was greeted as a friend not only by the OeVP but also by the SPÖ. Both hoped that the VDU would deprive the other party of valuable votes. In fact, the VDU collected about 12 percent of the Austrian electorate. According to an analysis, some 50 percent of these voters were former National Socialist Party members.

The few liberal figureheads which were necessary because of the occupation powers soon disappeared in the political outback. As the VDU amalgamated with the so-called "Freedom Party" to form the FPÖ in 1955/56, Anton Reinthaler, the strong German nationalist, assumed command. His long-term successor became the former member of the Waffen SS, Friedrich Peter, whose special unit--the 5th Company of the 10th Regiment of the 1st SS Infantry Brigade--participated in the murder of countless Jews in the Soviet Union in 1941 and 1942.

The reputation of the party developed with appropriate feebleness. For decades, the FPÖ had been considered as unworthy of being a coalition partner. As far back as 1970, when the socialists barely fell under the 50-percent mark, Bruno Kreisky dared not propose an official alliance with it. He preferred a minority government and bought the silent agreement of the Peter adherents in Parliament through a new election law which favored small parties.

It was not until Vienna attorney Norbert Steger seized the party leadership after an unprecedented sweep through the weakened FPÖ institutions in March 1980 that the brown shadows appeared to be receding.

This Steger, class of 1944, is the first FPÖ party chairman without a national socialist past ("the only thing brown about us was in our diapers"). He immediately promised that he did not wish to have the "beautiful party any longer messed up by old Nazis" and announced a major purge. The FPÖ was to become "purely liberal, a clean force" by his hand. In contrast to his predecessors, Steger claims to be neutral without restrictions. He said he had not the slightest problem saying "yes to Austria without reservations." On suitable occasions, he is in the habit of participating in the singing of the national anthem--and does it impressively well--because he practiced it diligently as a former member of the Vienna Boy's Choir.

So much patriotic effort had to pay off sooner or later. And truly, following the elections on 24 April 1983 in which the socialists, after 13 years of ruling alone fell below the absolute majority, departing Chancellor Kreisky swept the last reservations against an SPÖ/FPÖ coalition from the table. "The freedom people are today absolutely democratic," he persuaded himself and his suspicious colleagues.

Thus, after only 3 years as FPÖ head, Steger faced his goal. After a quarter century of fruitless effort, he had managed to finally bring the previously discriminated-against freedom party into the cabinet and to equip them there with six well-placed positions--the large SPÖ (47.7 percent of the votes) granted the small FPÖ (4.9 percent) the Justice Ministry as well as three

state secretaryships in addition to the trade and defense ministry positions. Steger himself, who also heads the Ministry of Trade also acts as vice chancellor.

However, what the "very refined man from Vienna" (as one FPÖ official said of his chief) did not accomplish was the festively announced party purge. Neither the old-timers from the Hitler period nor their sons wanted to take his "Nazi out" seriously. They continue, now as before, to hold ranks tightly.

Even in this fifth Steger year, the FPÖ doubtlessly represents the right-most of all political groupings with which a Social Democratic Party has thus far formed a coalition. According to extensively accepted estimates, at least 40 percent of its members are considered to be old or new Nazis. This is also confirmed by the most recent inquiries: 60 percent of Freedom Party voters considerate it "incompatible with the principles and the policies of the FPÖ for a Jew to become chairman"; 43 percent continue to be of the opinion that "the treatment of Jewish groups in the Third Reich is represented by the victorious powers in an exact rated manner"; 70 percent would like to replace the existing civil service "with a true labor service."

The present FPÖ minister of justice, Harald Ofner, thinks nothing of designating himself as an "Austrian German." The current FPÖ state secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture, Gerulf Murer, is the son of that Franz Murer, the adjutant to the Hitler-era territorial commissar in Wilna, who, in the opinion of the Soviets, must share responsibility in the death of 80,000 Jews. The current FPÖ minister of defense, Friedhelm Frischenschlager--as has been said: a relatively liberal person--appears without embarrassment at rallies organized by "traditional associations" of the former Waffen SS, although he "always appears only as a private citizen."

#### Amended Liberal Statute

Norbert Steger wants to convene a program-party convention in 1985 and provide his followers with a thoroughly amended statute which would be more liberal and less national in nature. The decisive coauthor of this work is Friedhelm Frischenschlager. The document will contain no language covering the oh so necessary "further development of German culture"; it will contain nothing about any desirable "efforts to achieve freedom of heredity disease on the basis of modern genetics."

However, not even in the case of nonobligatory theory will it be possible--the attempt will not even be made--to once and for all be rid of the brown eggshells. Not even the Program 85 proposal of the FPÖ defines a typical member by social origin or social environment. What is and remains decisive is his membership in the "German popular and cultural community."

5911

CSO: 3620/263

POLITICAL

BELGIUM

DEPREZ DEFENDS HIS LEADERSHIP OF WALLOON SOCIAL CHRISTIANS

Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE in French 7 Feb 85 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Gerard Deprez, president of the Christian Social Party (PSC), by A. M.; date not given]

[Text] Gerard Deprez has just been reelected as national president of the PSC and without a fight. On the eve of the congress which the PSC will hold Saturday on the UCL [Catholic University of Louvain] campus in Waluwe-Saint-Lambert, we thought it appropriate to question him about the health of the party.

Made head of a defeated group at the beginning of 1982, Deprez managed to reverse the trend somewhat in the communal and recent European elections, at least in Wallonia.

And yet, some do not believe that the president's record is satisfactory. Harsh criticisms circulate. We played the devil's advocate with Deprez, who admitted that he is "undoubtedly more popular with the voters than some *apparatchiks* who live off power."

For the future, one may recall that the prospect of the opposition does not frighten the "new" president of the PSC.

[Question] Some claim that out of fear of the verdict of the members of your party, you organized the presidential election "between two doors," as they say.

[Answer] It was my intention to do maximum publicity on the new election of the president. I had planned a schedule stretching over about two and a half months for all operations so as to enable possible candidates to organize. It was the board itself, at the prompting of a few of the important members, that decided to shorten the schedule considerably. But please believe that I was never afraid of universal suffrage and that I was not afraid this time either.

[Question] You did not encourage the emergence of other candidacies.

[Answer] I am not a masochist! Furthermore, I was interested in knowing whether or not there was in the PSC a level of dissatisfaction or frustration resulting in the emergence of other candidacies. Things must run their course.

[Question] Why did you not ask the members to rule on your single candidacy as Nothomb did?

[Answer] Without any intervention, I was presented as the candidate by some 15 districts. I would personally have wished a ratification of my election by the members with universal suffrage. However, I thought that it was up to the board to rule on this subject. I asked for nothing. The members of that powerful committee must be able to express themselves freely. The board deemed that it was not necessary to spend the considerable sums involved in an election by correspondence because there was only one candidate.

[Question] Can one be sure that you did not put any pressure on any potential candidate to refrain from running?

[Answer] I challenge anyone to find a single person in the PSC who wanted to be a candidate and whom I dissuaded from running. There is no one in the PSC who gathered five signatures for an alternative candidate.

Principles: The leadership of the PSC is often the object of criticism. We surveyed the most frequently heard negative remarks. Deprez wanted to get to the point.

[Question] Some criticize you for not placing enough emphasis on the Christian commitment of the PSC.

[Answer] Must I recall that it was I who, at the Verviers convention before the 1982 communal elections, insisted that party delegates to the congress be able to attend a mass outside. Naturally, this is a minor detail, but it is significant.

Speaking more in general, I would say that the PSC is a party that unites behind values rather than splitting on interests. Those values spring directly from the Christian heritage of Western society. We have never spoken so much within the PSC of freedom, generosity, enthusiasm.

Finally, I repeat that the PSC is not the party of the Church. It is a party of laymen who have convictions, a party that tries to rally voters behind a program. We are a political party and we organize a civil society. I want the PSC to be open to all those who agree with our values. You need no baptismal certificate to come to the PSC. Since 1945, the PSC has been nondenominational and I intend for it to remain so.

[Question] And yet, it is said that your party is not led in terms of principles, but rather, diverse contradictory strategies.

[Answer] Over the past three years, let them show me points of government action that we could not have taken collectively within the party. We have always remained on course and that is not easy on a problem such as the missiles, for example.



[Question] The criticism is also made of the PSC that it is not open enough and lacks internal democracy.

[Answer] They are then forgetting rather quickly that at the Louvain-la-Neuve congress in June 1982, I asked persons outside of the PSC to preside over committee work. If you are speaking of openness, that was more than a symbolic gesture.

As for internal democracy, do you know of any French-speaking party that informs its members more regularly than we do? Do you know of any equivalent of TEMPS NOUVEAUX?

Regarding the lists, every district could choose the most suitable procedure, the goal being to make up the list with the greatest consensus. For example, every district could conduct a poll. But we know that fraud is always possible.

What is essential is that all office holders be required, at one time or another, to place their mandate in the hands of the voters. No one holds a mandate by divine or acquired right. I would note that for the time being, practically all mandates are in the hands of the party. If some wish to go further in some districts, I am ready to go further.

Image

[Question] Unlike in the PRL [Party of Liberty and Reform], it is said that your party cannot create an image that lasts in public opinion. What is your opinion, Mr Deprez?

[Answer] That is extraordinary. In Walloon Brabant, the PSC rose by 5 percent in the European elections. We have once again become the second-ranking party in Walloon. For a party without a base in public opinion, those are surprising results, don't you think?

The truth is that some are impatient to win more and more rapidly, which is legitimate but also unrealistic. There are also persons who exaggerate their own weakness by lending strength to others and who never cease praising their main adversaries instead of maximizing their assets. That is not my style.

[Question] The party is often reproached for losing contact with Christian organizations.

[Answer] The party must be totally autonomous vis-a-vis pressure groups. I want to be done with the time when one could decide nothing without the opinion either of 121 Rue de la Loi (headquarters of the CSC [Confederation of Christian Trade Unions] and the MOC [Christian Workers Movement]) or some other social group. Political autonomy is the guarantee of the general interest of society.

Our relations with the rest of the Christian world are not bad. We have renewed our ties with the ADIC [expansion unknown] (Catholic employers). Our relations with the Christian mutual benefit societies are good. I admit that our



relations with part of the trade union organizations are more complicated because some of their members chose the SEP [expansion unknown]. With the youth movements, we have individual contacts, but they are very jealous about their own autonomy.

[Question] Some criticisms concern those around you. There is no more real staff, as under Nothomb.

[Answer] I am part of that team called "the gang of the four." That was a very good period for the PSC (between 1974 and 1979) and a bad period in government administration. Officials at that time acted as if the economic crisis did not exist. They continued to distribute. We are all paying for it today.

For 3 years, the PSC has perhaps been less victorious than at that time, but also thanks to us, the country is better managed. Which is better? Furthermore, if they want to criticize me, let them do so directly rather than getting at my aides. I chose them, they are good and I maintain my trust in them.

It is true that I am probably more popular with the voters than with a few "apparatchiks" who live off of power. I prefer the rank and file to those who spend their time in the corridors.

[Question] Have the "families" truly disappeared from the PSC?

[Answer] I do not remember, since I have been president, any real ideological quarrel. It is true that at the time the lists were drawn up, people from different backgrounds try to gain a good place, but that does not mean there is any doctrinal difference.

### Strategy

[Question] Let us now talk about post-election strategy. If there is an election failure, could the PSC go over to the opposition?

[Answer] The time has come for Social Christians to decide whether they want to be a government apparatus or a movement bearing the aspirations of the members of their community.

Only if the two elements of the current majority win the elections shall I argue that Social Christians should go over to the opposition. I believe in fact that the time has perhaps come to stand back a little. When one has governed for nearly 45 years, it is time to question oneself.

[Question] There is no question of going along with the socialists as a makeup force?

[Answer] Not at all. I have ceased defining the PSC as a makeup party or a party that can tip the balance. I want Social Christians to become a political current that will basically determine the political choices of Belgian society. I am not interested in making the political careers of ten persons or of 200 to 300 members of Cabinet and disregard a political responsibility to my country. That is my choice.

We must give priority to the political movement over the government machine. I am tired of pulling along people who reason only in terms of power rather than objectives. We must rally behind values rather than short-term, immediate interests.

[Question] Your greatest satisfaction after three years as president?

[Answer] The enormous support I have found among rank-and-file members wherever I have gone.

[Question] And your biggest disappointment?

[Answer] Seeing that friendship has a hard time standing up to quarrels over power, including within the party.

[Question] Will you be president for three more years?

[Answer] Statutorily, yes. But I alone am the judge.

[Question] Do you dream of becoming a minister?

[Answer] No.

11,464  
CSO: 3619/56

POLITICAL

CYPRUS

## ARCHBISHOP, DISY LEADER CLASH ON POLICIES

### Kliridis Attack

Nicosia O FILELEVTHEROS in Greek 15 Feb 85 p 1

[Excerpt] The DISY [Democratic Rally] leader answered the archbishop's statement harshly last night, charging that "he lives in luxury in his sumptuous mansion, isolated from the sacrificing and suffering people" and "he has only melodious demagogic slogans to his credit which, if implemented, would lead to complete Turkization."

In his statement, Kliridis says: "It appears that the church primate, Archbishop Khrysostomos, has contracted to undertake the legal job of defending the policy and maneuvers of the DIKO [Democratic Party] president and minority president of the republic, Kyprianou.

"With his personal statement yesterday, he is vainly trying to pin party expediencies and ulterior motives on our positions, and with naive reasoning he charges that we are politically blind or we do not have a national consciousness, that we are carrying water to the Turkish propaganda mill and that we are facilitating partitionment and complete Turkization."

### Archbishop's Reply

Nicosia O FILELEVTHEROS in Greek 16 Feb 85 p 1

[Excerpt] In a new statement yesterday concerning DISY President Kliridis, Archbishop Khrysostomos states:

"We are sorry that Glavkos Kliridis lost his temper and turned to a personal attack and insults against us. The lack of proof and his inability to refute the things he had said drove him to this blunder. Permit us to say to him that men, and, in fact, those who want to lead the people, have the courage to admit their mistakes and respect the truth. Unfortunately, Kliridis did not show this courage.

"At any rate, we will not follow him in the course he took and for this reason we will avoid asking him to tell us his credo as concerns his religious faith and his national affiliation. Because he repudiated both of these long ago with his actions and statements.

"What we call on him to do, if he wishes to respect the people and sincerely serve the country, is to be consistent to his credo and learn to tell the truth. It is his right to believe whatever he wishes, but it is not his right to deceive the people in order to be kept as leader of a faction which has in it fairly sound forces from both a religious and national standpoint. The AKEL leadership, with which it agreed, is at least consistent to its ideological placement and world theory.

"As regards the luxury of the Archbishop's Mansion, to which Kliridis referred and concerning which he seems to begrudge us, we assure him that we are not the ones who chose it and we are sorry we cannot offer it to him.

"As concerns [the statement] that we must accept compromise in order to save the country and our people, we observe that the policy of compromise has some limits and when we exceed them, not only are we not saving, we are confirming and legalizing destruction and calamity. And Kliridis recommended exceeding these limits a long time ago. We call on Kliridis to tell us when he has said no to the Turks or showed a political or any other kind of resistance to Turkey's expansionist policy.

"We pray to God to enlighten Kliridis so he will know himself better and through this familiarity become aware of his job and act analogously. It is the best service he can offer to our country and people."

9247

CS0: 3521/193

POLITICAL

CYPRUS

INFORMAL POLL ON KYPRIANOU POLICY

Nicosia O FILELEVTHEROS in Greek 15 Feb 85 p 12

[Text] The Agency for Middle Eastern Research, AMER, published the results of a new poll which occurred at the beginning of February, one month after its previous poll which took place on 2 to 10 January.

There were no particular reasons for the new poll. The agency's personnel simply had nothing else to do, said the director, Papadopoulos.

The poll cost 1,500 pounds, which was covered by the agency.

The questions presented related to the high-level meeting, developments on our domestic front and what would be the results if parliamentary elections were held now.

A total of 600 people were questioned, 120 of whom are supporters of AKEL, 206 of DIKO [Democratic Party], 132 of DISY [Democratic Rally] and 42 of EDEK, according to AMER assertions. The other 100 people did not express any party affiliation and entered themselves in the column "others."

The related results are recorded in the related form with the above proportion of participation in the poll.

Question: Did President Kyprianou handle the high-level meeting correctly?

Forty-five percent answered that President Kyprianou should have signed several points and negotiated on others. Forty-two percent answered that he should not have signed anything, or that there was nothing to be signed.

Concerning responsibilities relating to the failure of the talks: Two-thirds lay the blame on Denktas, 13 percent on President Kyprianou and another 13 percent on De Cuellar.

9247

CSO: 3521/193

POLITICAL

DENMARK

LEFT SOCIALIST PARTY GROUP REVOLTS OVER AFGHANISTAN POLICY

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 8 Feb 85 p 11

[Article by Peter Eriksen]

[Text] It is of secondary importance whether the Afghan partisan forces support feudalism, capitalism, socialism, or something entirely different. Their demand that the Soviet invaders leave their country is justified. For this reason, it must be supported.

This was stated by a group of Left-Socialist Party (VS) members in an open letter to INFORMATION. The stated purpose was to eliminate the "current confusion over the party's fundamental principles of socialism and democracy."

The salient points of the statement are given below. The VS members drew up the statement in connection with the so-called Wilhjelm Initiative--or the "Democracy and Socialism Initiative," as they prefer to call it.

The introduction to the statement indicates that by the term "confusion" the group means the debate that arose in the press after VS refused to support the demonstration on 27 December 1984 against the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan.

A Very Strong Word

INFORMATION asked Klavs Birkholm if some of the confusion had not occurred because the defense of the right to national self-determination had been called a matter of principle and the condemnation of military intervention, similarly, had been called a matter of principle (the statement's own emphasis).

Principles are generally thought of as ideas from which deviations may be made under special circumstances. Consider, for example, the statements of principle that are issued by the political parties.

"That is not what we mean. To us, the word 'principle' means unconditionally and always. This should be made clear by the fact that, later in the statement, we say that VS must not permit a tactical view of democratic principles."

Why, then, did you not write "unconditional" or "always?"

"I never saw that as a problem. To me, the word 'principle' is a very strong word. It is perhaps a bourgeois use of the word that has made its meaning unclear. On the other hand, it may be a case of party jargon on our part that has prevented me from seeing the problem."

Concrete Evaluation?

Is it not somewhat exaggerated for you to write about "NATO parties that make a 'concrete, political evaluation' in each particular case." Do you have any evidence that this is the case, for example, with the Social Democrats?

"There was the time when the Social Democrats called for caution in criticism of Jaruzelski's introduction of martial law in Poland."

Was that not a case of the right to national self-determination as opposed to military intervention?

"It was perhaps not a military intervention per se. We are thinking primarily of the NATO parties that have been and are the driving force behind maintaining NATO unity at all costs. A good example is that these parties immediately condemned the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, but waited for years to criticize the United States intervention in Vietnam--and finally did so only as a result of a large popular protest movement."

When you say that it is a secondary matter whether the Afghan partisan forces support feudalism or capitalism, do you not need to make an extra effort to explain your principles of socialism and democracy, if you are to have a coherent position?

"What type of explanation?"

Something to the effect that, of course, you support the democratic struggle of the common Afghan citizen against the oppression of feudalism and capitalism and will continue to do so after the Soviet invaders are driven out?

"That is well-stated. I would agree with that. I am almost sorry we did not include that statement."

Finally, a somewhat impudent remark: In addition to the 10 names that appear under the statement, there are two that were blotted out. If you hold the statement to the light, you can see that the individuals in question are members of parliament Keld Albrechtsen and Anne Grete Holmsgard. Why are these names crossed out?

"That is a good question, but I would prefer that you ask them,"

Cut And Dried

That is precisely what we did.

Keld Albrechtsen: "I agree with the statement itself, but the introduction states that the VS position on the right to national self-determination of



the Afghan people has been called into question. That does not reflect a correct understanding of our executive committee's majority position on the Afghanistan demonstration. I admit that we may be justly criticized for not explaining this position clearly enough, but it was and is an expression of agreement that the Soviet Union should leave Afghanistan."

"Then the introduction talks about the Democracy and Socialism Initiative as an 'insurrectionary movement.' To be sure, it uses quotation marks, but I disagree with this indication that there is an insurrection within VS."

"Finally, there is a concluding remark concerning a 'condemnation of the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea and support for the national liberation struggle of the Khmer people.' This is a borderline case in which I find it difficult simply to condemn the invasion itself during the bloody terrorist regime of Pol Pot. Of course, we must demand a solution that would end Vietnam's military presence in Kampuchea, but a mere condemnation will not bring about this result."

Anne Grete Holmsgard: "I agree totally with the statement's section on Afghanistan and on democracy and self-determination. But the final statement on Kampuchea is a short, cut-and-dried formulation of a problem that is considerably more complex. I would like to know what I am signing and, as the statement is worded, I do not feel that I know."

#### The VS Statement

"The right to national self-determination is inseparable from the socialistic and democratic goals of the Left-Socialist Party."

"The Left-Socialists defend, as a matter of principle, the right to national self-determination and oppose military intervention, as a matter of principle. In this regard, we differ from both DKP (Communist Party of Denmark) and the NATO parties which, in each individual case, make a 'concrete, political evaluation' (Does intervention favor the 'correct' forces? What does this intervention mean in terms of the global balance of power? etc.)."

"We regret that certain groups within VS have come to doubt this principle, which has been a fundamental component of the historical tradition of Left-Socialism since the party condemned the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 (and has determined the party's position on conflicts such as Yugoslavia in 1948, Hungary in 1956, and Poland since 1980)."

"It is the primary goal of our initiative to eliminate such confusion from VS. VS must not allow a tactical view of democratic principles. The party simply cannot live with that. A tactical (unprincipled) view of the principles of democracy is irreconcilable with the means and ends of the Left-Socialist Party."

"Thus, we stress in our statement (and in our proposals to the upcoming party congress) that 'democratic rights and guarantees are inalienable and must include everyone, regardless of political beliefs and class affiliation.' We

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even temporarily,' regardless of what  
such a 'temporary suspension' of righ

"It is our fundamental belief that so  
makes the same demands in the realm o  
friends that it makes on political en

"Thus, in the current situation, it i  
Afghan partisan forces support feudal  
entirely different. Their demand tha  
their country is justified. For this

"In other words, to the extent that o  
party congress, they will help elimin  
fundamental principles of socialism a  
Left-Socialist Party."

Signed by:

Helle Antczak  
Klavs Birkholm  
Else Dombernowsky  
Steen Folke  
Lisbet Gundlund  
Jorgen Lenger  
Erik Sigsgaard  
Ebbe Sonderris  
Steen Tinning  
Preben Wilhjelm

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CSO: 3613/112

POLITICAL

FRANCE

# PCF FEDERAL CONFERENCES REVEAL SIGNIFICANT OPPOSITION

Paris LIBERATION in French 22 Jan 85 p 5

[Article by Eric Dupin]

[Text] The breakthrough of critical votes on the resolution of the 25th PCF Congress has occurred even in the federal conferences, where opposition votes are usually stifled.

The event of the 25th Congress has come and gone. Rank and file votes on the draft resolution have revealed that a large minority of communist militants no longer have confidence in their party's leadership. For the first time, opposition is no longer a marginal phenomenon in the PCF. This is indicated by the final section conferences and the first federal conferences, which were held this weekend.

It is revealing that such opposition has managed to gain expression in the federal conferences, for their delegates are already second-degree elected officials. In the cells, the militants elect the delegates to section conferences, which in turn appoint delegates to the federal conferences. At each stage, minorities watch as their representation is seriously diminished. Which means that the results of some federal conferences are a sign of very broad opposition.

In Charente, 80 delegates voted in favor of the draft resolution and 39 abstained. In Creuse, 45 delegates voted yes, 17 abstained and 15 were opposed. In Moselle, approximately one-third abstained or voted no. In Herault, some 200 delegates voted in favor of the resolution, but about 30 were opposed. The draft resolution was also seriously amended in that department. The leadership's text was extensively revised in Correze and Bas-Rhin as well before being adopted unanimously. Smaller minorities have emerged in other federal conferences, as in Pas-de-Calais (6 abstentions and 4 opposed out of approximately 400 delegates) and Vendee (5 abstentions among approximately 100 delegates).

L'HUMANITE reported yesterday for the first time on preliminary voting at the congress. The communist daily stated that in 22 federations the draft resolution was approved by 90 percent of the delegates, with 5 percent

abstaining and 5 percent opposed. This 10 percent opposition at the federal level greatly reduces the defiance shown by the rank and file. One example: of the delegates to the Paris 12-Reuilly-Picpus section conference, 121 voted yes, 11 abstained and 1 voted no, but they sent 6 delegates supporting the resolution and only 1 abstention to the Paris federal conference.

Thus the votes in the section conferences are closer to the actual balance of power in the party. Often the draft resolution is adopted almost unanimously, but there are many locations where opposition is voiced. In Poitiers (Vienne), 47 delegates voted in favor of the resolution and 48 abstained. In Nancy (Meurthe-et-Moselle), the majority voted against the resolution. In Metz (Moselle), the draft resolution was adopted by a minority of delegates. A good number of sections in the Paris area also cast heterogeneous votes: Aubervilliers (25 opposed and 35 abstentions out of approximately 160 delegates), Bagnolet (25 percent against and abstaining), Bondy (1 opposed, 7 abstentions and 26 in favor), La Defense (2 opposed, 5 abstentions, 22 in favor), Saint-Denis (20 opposed, 40 abstentions, approximately 200 in favor). And there is still rampant opposition in Paris as well. Let us cite only the 19th Fabien section: 30 in favor, 10 abstentions and 2 opposed. The traditional party spirit is definitely on the decline everywhere.

11915

CSO: 3519/159

POLITICAL

FRANCE

KARLIN DISCUSSES PCF MILITANT CONCERNS ABOUT PARTY

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 14 Jan 85 p 6

[Article by Daniel Karlin, Lamand-Avenel Cell, Pre-Saint-Gervais Section, Seine-Saint-Denis Federation, and Tony Laine: "Concerning Living Systems"]

[Text] First, a few remarks to explain the double signature on this article, which, like all the others, is individual. We wrote once in our first joint book that our ... "plural I is like the joint telling of an old story...." Let it therefore be clear that this text is not the product of two people, but of one author--communist--who has been expressing his thoughts for 10 years in the first person singular.

Modern science attributes fundamental importance to the function and quality of communication among living beings, individuals, plants or social groups.

In short, it can be said that any system (a heating unit, a group, substance, institution, living organism, etc.) is doomed to perish or die when it establishes itself as a closed system, inwardly oriented and rejecting the dialectics of information, i.e., the exchange of information in both directions with the world surrounding it. It then moves toward increasing internal disorder that is measured as entropy, with maximum entropy corresponding to a state of incoherence that is the distinguishing feature of decomposition and death. In contrast, the assurance of life and vitality is basically linked to the ability to introduce a movement of information in both directions. In this instance, information means what is new, unexpected, stimulating and the ability to assemble a different organization and to break with repetition.

My purpose here, of course, is not to provide an expert contribution or to make some sort of attempt at scientific popularization. My intention is to talk about my party and its resources for remaining an open and thus living system, by subsequently exercising its replenished capacity for incorporating the world's changes.

But what do I see around me? What do the communists around me and those that I meet almost everywhere, by chance during my travels and the debates in which I participate, talk to me about? The militants have remained the same, men and women of the enthusiasm and brotherhood of my youth, comrades of all ages, whose dignity, intelligence, courage and generosity still arouse in me the

same tenderness and the same admiration. But most of them are worried today, even often distraught, particularly because they find no trace of the questions they ask themselves acutely in either L'HUMANITE or in the party's writings and statements. They are presently suffering from a real identity crisis as communists, they who have supported a party that they were convinced could and should decisively influence the course of this country's history, and whose influence and following they see declining disturbingly day after day. They suddenly feel helpless--as though matters were beyond their reach. Not heard, they feel dispossessed of the creative role which is another integral part of their communist identity: they have the feeling that their basic role is gradually being reduced to only understanding and conveying the analyses from "on high," as they say. It is as though democratic centralism, in our party, had become pedagogical centralism....

Let's go even further. For several years the party's leadership has been formulating, one after another, analyses which regularly follow prior analyses which we have been told, also just as regularly, have been erroneous, as in the recent period of 1981 and 1984.... But how can such a series of mistakes be explained in the case of a revolutionary party?

Without doubt, in a country such as France the class struggle has not abated, to say the least, in recent years. On the contrary, and I do not underestimate the hostility, indeed sometimes the hatred, of the political forces around us. I affirm, however, for my part, that the main cause of these successive mistakes is to be found in the nonfunctional state of democratic centralism, at a time when the choice of a step-by-step strategy (which I support) has made such democratic centralism a more vital instrument than ever. But how is it possible to carry out this step-by-step strategy without constantly listening to the people of this country, as well as to the entire body of militants? I spoke earlier of closed systems: for several years, everything has been proceeding as though the leadership considered negligible what comes "from below," to continue to use the stock vocabulary. The leadership formulates analyses among its own members and announces the gospel; otherwise, there is total intolerance to anything from outside, matched by almost total silence concerning what has really been happening within our party for several months. The problem this raises is that if the leadership does not hear, it can no longer be heard, and thus it is the entire party which, in relation to the people of this country, risks becoming a closed system. Such is my worry at the present time.

But then what are the solutions, you might ask. Well to be specific, the solutions are those effectively formulated on the basis of the views and living creation of all of this party's militants, i.e., on the basis of a return to true democratic centralism.

11915

CSO: 3519/159



POLITICAL

FRANCE

#### GAINS SEEN FOR UDF DURING PAST YEAR

Paris LE FIGARO in French 29/30 Dec 84 p 6

[Article by Olivier Pognon: "UDF: The Assets of Diversity"]

[Text] The UDF was rather reserved in 1984. An election cartel rather than a homogeneous movement, it is its nature to express its views particularly at election time. But this year, as it turns out, the confederation of liberals and centrists chose, like the RPR, to assume a low profile--to the benefit of opposition unity at the time of the European Parliament elections in June.

This is both the UDF's originality and resourcefulness, in some respects, and a source of handicaps: although it has rallied, since 1978, political parties united behind Valery Giscard d'Estaing but with very different doctrinal roots, the confederation has not managed to synthesize its components. And these factions, basically the Republican Party [PR], Social Democratic Center Party [CDS] and Radical Party, being aware that alone they each embody a mainstream of ideas, continue to exist and to express themselves at their own pace and with a rather haughty spirit of independence. For example, Francois Leotard said two months ago that he didn't intend "to devote all his energy to the UDF, because that is exhausting," an attitude which is precisely that of CDS Chairman Pierre Mehaignerie and Radical Party Chairman Andre Rossinot, even if they don't use the same language.

But the relatively low profile of the confederation led by Jean Lecanuet in no way means that its existence is threatened or that it is doing poorly. Its existence is quite well assured as long as the conditions which prevailed at its birth continue to exist: the vital necessity that its component groups form a united front in elections. According to some people, a modification of the voting process, with the introduction of proportional voting, could jeopardize that necessity. Nothing is less certain, as shown by the European Parliament elections, and the concentration of political forces is particularly related to national governments and the way in which the chief of state is elected.

As a confederation, the UDF is doing well and enjoying the same good health as its component factions, which have continued to pile up election victories for two years. It is doing very well as a parliamentary group in the National



Assembly, where every problem is solved masterfully by a warm and clever chairman, Jean-Claude Gaudin, and where young deputies (Messrs d'Aubert, Madelin, Millon, Alphandery, Clement), flanked by certain elders such as Gilbert Gantier, are continuing a very invigorating opposition therapy, in regard to the task they are accomplishing. In any case, such therapy is highly promising for alternation of leadership. Finally, this year the UDF solved a delicate problem, that of its direct members, by taking responsibility for them away from Michel Pinton, too inclined to create a state within a state, and turning it over to Mr Paul Girod, senator from Aisne, and Mr Philippe Mestre, deputy from Vendee and Raymond Barre's former chief of staff.

The confederation's various components still have to find a way to agree, when the time comes, on a viable presidential candidate, since both Valery Giscard d'Estaing and Raymond Barre have deeply committed supporters within its ranks. This is a matter that everyone has agreed to postpone, since for the present the important thing is to win the cantonal elections and then the parliamentary elections.

#### PR: The Leotard Year

In the Republican Party, 1984 was undeniably the Leotard Year. Elected general secretary in May 1982, 12 months ago the deputy from Var was still just one of the most visible representatives of the new generation. He ended the year with the aura of a movie star. In this regard, only RPR General Secretary Jacques Toubon is a rival figure in his generation. Things started in January, when he ran against the sole opposition ticket in the European Parliament elections, even going so far as to resign as UDF vice chairman to protest a strategy which he considered wrong and threatening to form a separate ticket. The PR general secretary didn't win his case and didn't carry out his threats. His party was listed on the Veil ticket as the entire opposition. However, it appears that in the process he acquired notoriety that he didn't have previously and a reputation for sincerity. Since the time that the French have been able to distinguish between the promises of the socialists and their actions, sincerity has been a highly sought-after political commodity. Francois Leotard is trying hard to make the most of this capital. He talks a lot and is not afraid to bring up sensitive issues. For example, he has demanded that the UDF's organization be modified so that the PR's influence therein will be proportional to its size. And he reiterated his devotion to Valery Giscard d'Estaing at a time when a movement in support of Raymond Barre was taking shape within his party.

#### CDS: The Liberal Alliance

The PR general secretary managed to secure control of his party's apparatus for Giscardians at the time of its congress in October. But those campaigning for Raymond Barre behind Charles Millon, deputy from Ain, rallied around a publication, LE CONTRAT LIBERAL, whose first issue has recently appeared. And Francois Leotard was forced to recognize the former prime minister's success at a rally organized by the Republican Federation of Haute-Garonne in Toulouse last month. The Republican Party thus ended the year with a majority and a minority that will have to come to terms in order to live together.

The centrists, the vast majority of whom do not conceal their sympathy for the deputy from Lyon, have solved the problem for the time being: their chairman, Pierre Mehaignerie, repeats that the choice of a viable presidential candidate is not an immediate concern. The opposition's job is to fight to win the cantonal and parliamentary elections. After that, they will sort things out. This was the keynote of their congress, held in Toulouse in October, in which more of them gathered together than had in a long time and expressed confidence concerning their future.

Of course, Robert Schuman's heirs also showed rather poor taste by participating in the sole opposition ticket in the European Parliament elections. But like their partners, they found in the by-elections, which continued the movement of last year's municipal elections, some good reasons to be encouraged. They have others as well: having occasionally had certain complexes about being seated in the former majority next to partners whom they did not consider reformist enough, they now feel completely at ease in the fight against the left. The government's program and its effects have found them to be opponents as determined as anyone, even if some, such as Bernard Stasi, advocate less systematic opposition language. The year 1984--with the school war and the June procession--probably dispelled the final illusions, that is, the few remaining ones that had not already disappeared right after the victory of the left. The center's future lies with the liberals and nowhere else.

The radicals have probably also had this impression of finally becoming firmly established within a camp. The Stirn ticket's glaring defeat in the European Parliament elections, demonstrating that there was no room between the left and the UDF, must have been further evidence to them as well that their only possible fate was to be part of the opposition, at the side of the liberals and centrists.

Despite certain appearances, the year 1984 has therefore most likely been beneficial for the UDF.

11915

CSO: 3519/157

POLITICAL

ICELAND

## POLLS SHOW DECLINING SUPPORT FOR COALITION PARTIES, GOVERNMENT

### People's Alliance Suffers Setback

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 6 Mar 85 p 56

[Article: "Hagvangur Opinion Poll Results: Independence Party 40.4 Percent-- Social Democratic Party 20.5 Percent"]

[Text] Women's List Number Three

The Social Democratic Party now has the second greatest voter support among the political parties, surpassed only by the Independence Party, according to a new opinion poll that Hagvangur conducted on the support for the political parties. Compared with the latest Hagvangur survey that was conducted in September and October last year, the Social Democratic Party has increased its support from 7.0 percent to 20.5 percent and the Women's List has increased its support from 8.9 percent to 11.2 percent from the previous Hagvangur poll. According to the survey, the Independence Party now has 40.4 percent voter support but had 45.7 percent in the last Hagvangur survey.

According to this poll, the People's Alliance has 10.8 percent support but had 16.1 percent in the last poll. The Progressive Party has 9.9 percent but had 14.6 percent, and the Social Democratic Alliance now has 6.0 percent support but had 6.2 percent in the last Hagvangur poll. For comparison it may be mentioned that in the last parliamentary elections the results were as follows: the People's Alliance 17.3 percent, the Social Democratic Party 11.7 percent, the Social Democratic Alliance 7.3 percent, the Progressive Party 18.5 percent, the Women's List 5.5 percent and the Independence Party 38.7 percent.

The survey covered the whole country and the 1,000 participants, 18-year-old and over, were picked at random from the National Registry by the Computer Center of the University of Iceland with the approval of the Statistical Bureau of Iceland and the computer commission. The question was: "If parliamentary elections were to take place in the next few days, what political party or alliance would you most likely vote for?" The results are as follows: the People's Alliance 6.6 percent; the Social Democratic Party 12.6 percent;

the Social Democratic Alliance 3.7 percent; the Progressive Party 6.1 percent; the Women's List 6.9 percent; the Independence Party 24.8 percent; others 0.8 percent; 3.4 percent said they would not vote; 6.6 percent would return a blank ballot; 21.6 percent were undecided and 6.9 percent refused to answer.

If only those who took a position are counted, or 61.5 percent of those polled, the results are as shown in the following table. Also included, for comparison, are the results from three opinion polls from last year and the results of the last parliamentary elections:

	<u>Feb. '85</u>	<u>Sept. Oct. '84</u>	<u>July '84</u>	<u>April '84</u>	<u>Elections results</u>
People's Alliance	10.8	16.1	14.9	9.3	17.3
Social Democratic Party	20.5	7.0	6.4	6.8	11.7
Social Democratic Alliance	6.0	6.2	6.2	3.7	7.3
Progressive Party	9.9	14.6	14.7	17.1	18.5
Women's List	11.2	8.9	8.1	9.2	5.5
Independence Party	40.4	45.7	48.8	52.1	38.7
Other	1.2	1.5	0.9	1.8	1.0

#### Support for Government Drops

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 7 Mar 85 p X2

[Article : "Hagvangur Opinion Poll: The Government in Majority in the Rural Areas--Minority in the Metropolitan Area"]

[Text] The government has the support of slightly over half of the voters, according to a survey that was recently conducted by Hagvangur. Of those who were polled and took a position, 50.2 percent supported the government but 49.8 percent were against it.

The support for the government is greater in the rural areas than in the metropolitan area. The support is greatest in the sparsely populated rural areas where there is 72.1 percent support for the government and 27.9 percent opposition. In densely populated rural areas the government support is 50.4 percent and 49.6 percent are opposed. The government was less popular among the participants in the metropolitan area where it was supported by 47.9 percent and opposed by 52.1 percent. The government is more popular among women than men. Of the men that were polled, 48.7 percent supported the government and 51.3 percent were opposed. Among the women, 51.7 percent support the government and 48.3 percent were opposed.

This opinion poll was conducted during the period 19-28 February. The sample included 1,000 people. The gross response percentage was 78.5 percent and 82.9 percent net. The survey was conducted by telephone and covered the whole country. The participants were 18 years old and over.

The table shows the distribution of all people polled as well as comparable figures from earlier polls conducted by Hagvangur.

Do you or do you not support the current government?

	<u>Feb. '85</u>	<u>Sept./Oct. '84</u>	<u>July '84</u>	<u>April '84</u>
Support	41.9	47.5	58.0	69.6
Do not support	41.5	40.3	26.5	20.5
Do not know	13.6	8.9	12.7	7.9
Refuse to answer	2.9	3.3	2.8	2.0

9583

CSO: 3626/24

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

#### SALGUEIRO GROUP LOOKS AGAIN TO FIRMINO MIGUEL

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 16 Feb 85 pp 1, 24

[Text] The revival of Firmino Miguel's candidacy for the presidency of the republic, but as an independent candidate supported by the PSD [Social Democratic Party], is beginning to take shape among certain members of the so-called "Salgueirista" faction of the Social Democrats. The first evident and public sign of this new attempt to launch Firmino Miguel--now advocated by the so-called "civilistas" [proponents of a civilian candidate] and no longer by Neta Pinto--came from Jose Vitorino, president of the Faro district committee, who, in statements to EXPRESSO, said he considered Firmino Miguel "a good candidate and a good president."

This idea is contained in a motion which Jose Vitorino presented to his district yesterday evening; it is intended, according to Vitorino, to be an early response to the internal referendum on the presidential elections which the PSD will conduct in late March. Vitorino considers that Gen Firmino Miguel could still be a good potential candidate for his party, if "the general says he is available" and "if he makes his position clear on the changes which the Portuguese society requires."

Meanwhile, other leaders of the so-called "Salgueirista" line argue, still privately, that only a military candidacy, with Firmino Miguel or another general, will enable the PSD to win the presidential election, because any civilian candidacy (particularly that of a party militant) would simply mean a "candidate in name only," to allow Soares to win the election. In the same circles, it is thought that the referendum, as it is set up, is destined to rule out a [military] candidacy, because the party militants will naturally be led to prefer a PSD member for their candidate to Belem.

#### Firmino Miguel

Meanwhile, EXPRESSO has learned that, about 15 days ago, the Salgueirist faction, meeting in a Lisbon hotel to prepare for the Bonfim national council, broadly debated the issue of the presidential elections and the possible candidate, and most of the participants thought that a military candidacy was more suitable.

In that meeting, only three individuals voiced strong opposition to any military candidacy: Carlos Pimenta, former secretary of state for environmental affairs;

Pedro Pinto, leader of the JDS [Social Democratic Youth]; and PSD Deputy Mario Adegas. As was to be expected, the principal advocate and "theorist" for a military candidacy was Deputy Silva Marques, who is now a member of the PSD National Political Commission.

Moreover, PSD leaders of the Joao Salgueiro group have been making contacts with Gen Firmino Miguel for several weeks.

6362

CSO: 3542/126



26 March 1985

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

## GOVERNMENT CRISIS: VICTORIES FOR SOARES

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 16 Feb 85 p 3

[Article by Jose Antonio Saraiva: "The Next Victim"]

[Text] In just two weekends, Mario Soares, prime minister and secretary general of the PS [Socialist Party] totted up five victories. In fact, with the fall of Mota Pinto 15 days ago and his replacement by Rio Machete 8 days ago, Soares securely recovered what he had lost in less than 2 years at the head of the government.

The first victory for Mario Soares consisted in the defeat of the man who would certainly be his principal opponent in the presidential elections: Firmino Miguel.

It will make very little sense, in fact, for the new party leaders to name, as their presidential candidate, a man who was the choice of precisely the same leader whom they had just overturned.

Firmino Miguel's chances were thus jeopardized at the moment when Mota Pinto fell--and if this is confirmed, Soares will have no opponent at the end of the year.

Mario's second victory consisted in the fact that Salgueiro, Capucho and Marcelo consented to form the leadership of the PSD [Social Democratic Party].

Actually, up to now they have been a continuing destabilizing factor, inasmuch as they used every opportunity to attempt to set the PSD against the decisions of the government.

Well, from the moment that they agreed to join the new directive body of the PSD, it became unlikely that they would continue to attack the executive, particularly because the president of the organ which they have now joined is also vice president of the government.

Therefore, Salgueiro, Capucho and Marcelo have lost their former maneuvering room and the internal opposition to the coalition will be reduced to virtually zero.

Mario's third victory consisted in the possibility of replacing some very controversial names whom he has considered as prejudicial to the image of the cabinet; such names, for example, as Jose Augusto Seabra and Eugenio Nobre,

whom the prime minister has kept on only  
Now that Pinto is gone, they can be dismissed.

The fourth victory for Mario Soares consists in the fact that  
which his government will have with the parliament.

In fact, up to now there was speculation that the parliament would  
the parliament and fire the government.

Well, since he has now consented to a new election, there is  
no real possibility of sending down the government.  
The acceptance of the remodeling meant a new  
team.

Mario's fifth victory consisted in the fact that he has  
aroused among the Portuguese.

The Social Democratic Party has definitely become  
perfidious. Soares, on the contrary, has been able to convince  
Democrats to settle their differences and accept a new  
new leadership and the new candidates for the next election.  
an image of serenity, tranquillity and confidence.

In short: the PS and its leader appear to be  
entrusted with the government of the country at this  
moment it could drag the country into a new crisis.

It will be argued that, with this new leadership, the PS has  
its image.

This is not what people are thinking.

After what has happened since the death of Balsemao and Mota Pinto--the Portuguese people are looking for  
fall of Balsemao and Mota Pinto--the Portuguese people are looking for  
as the new leader of whom great things are expected.  
next man to take a beating from his own people.

As the next victim.

Well, for a leader, this will never be a good thing.

6362  
CS0: 3542/126

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

# PINTASILGO IN PRESIDENTIAL RACE TO STAY

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 16 Feb 85 p 64

[Text] Former Prime Minister Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo, meeting privately with her supporters in the union sector, confirmed on Wednesday that she would go "all the way" with her candidacy for presidency of the republic.

"My candidacy is certain and I will not withdraw in favor of anyone," she declared. Pintasilgo's peremptory tone is seen as a clear step forward from her previous statements, in which Eanes' counselor said she would be a candidate unless "a better candidate appeared" in the same political area and with a program similar to hers.

Be that as it may, Pintasilgo has set July as the deadline for the official announcement of her entry into the race for Belem, "after meditating" on the support which she has received by then. According to our information, Wednesday's meeting was attended by union activists and leaders affiliated with both the CGTP [General Federation of Portuguese workers/National Intersindical] and the UGT [General Union of Workers]. They included Joaquim Vanancio, who recently joined Sindetex (UGT), after having been one of the founders of the Intersindical and having been in the directorate of the Southern Textile and Woolens Union and the secretariat of the USL [Lisbon Union Federation].

The meeting was one of a number of meetings planned by Pintasilgo's "entourage." She had already met with university instructors of Porto and Coimbra. We learned from a reliable source that a meeting with priests in the Lisbon area, initially scheduled for this week, was cancelled because of problems in bringing them all together.

## Left Falls Back

Meanwhile, for the first time in recent months, the non-Socialist potential candidates for the presidency of the republic have shown better poll results than the Socialist candidates.

In the last MARKTEST/ JORNAL survey, the Socialists (Mario Soares and Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo) would be supported by 35 percent of the respondents, while the non-Socialists (Alberto Joao Jardim, Mota Anaral, Pinto Balsemao, Luca Pires, Freitas do Amaral, Firmino Miguel and Mota Pinto) obtained the support of 36 percent of those surveyed.

On the other hand, in a theoretical contest between Firmino Miguel and Lourdes Pintasilgo for the second round, the respondents gave the victory to Pintasilgo, with 45 percent, as against 24 percent for Firmino Miguel.

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

POLITICAL OUTLOOK SAID PESSIMISTIC

Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 19 Feb 85 p 4

[Article by Manuel Maria Murias: "A Cut-Throat Future"]

[Text] With the exit of Sr Mota Pinto, the PSD [Social Democratic Party] radically removed any possibility of a military candidacy for the presidential election this year. Put together with spit, the leadership solution adopted by the Social democrats significantly weakens the position of the Center-left at the government level, it strengthens the influence of Sr Ramalho Eanes as the last hope for the solution of the political problems without resorting to authoritarian formulas and, inevitably, it creates the possibility that, in the second round of the presidential elections, the so-called citizen voters will find themselves grotesquely forced to choose between Sr Mario Soarea and Sra Lourdes Pintasilgo. Deo gratias.

By the manner in which the whole campaign to destroy Mota Pinto was conducted, there is every evidence that this was the objective of his adversaries. It was known, in all conscience, that the presentation of a presidential candidate in that rainy month of January, months before the start of the election campaign, would be a monstrous tactical error; the candidate would be exposed to attack from all his adversaries and after a few weeks he would be torn to tatters, no good for anything. It was known and is known that a party candidate, even with the unequalled charisma of Sr Alberto Joao Jardim, had and has no arithmetical possibility of being elected; first, because the Center Right does not have a voting majority in Portugal and, second, because the CSD [Social Democratic Center Party] could not support the candidate. It is also known that, despite everything, Sr Mota Pinto was the only individual in the party capable of blending together all the turbulent factions in the party--Marcelistas on one side, Salgueristas on the other; Fontouristas here, Machetistas there.

Before you could say "alas," the PSD became again the orphan of Camarate. The sentimentalization of vital political issues has taken over the party and will prevent it from presenting itself with firmness and rigor in the various elections coming up this year, in such a way as to make it a serious competitor to the hegemony of the PS [Socialist Party] and the ambitions of the Fanists.

At the moment, then, it happens that the only party candidate with the capacity to win the next presidential election is Mario Soares--and, at the same time,

we see that his only opponent with any chance of success is Maria Lourdes Pintasilgo, if she can arrange the financial backing and can set up a structured and efficient national campaign organization. The CDS is a small party which has not adjusted to the desertion of the father who has abandoned wife and children; the PSD is a bucket of eels; the PC [Communist Party] will vote for the lesser evil.

The barons of the PSD wanted a civilian candidate. There they are. Machete preferred Soares; Marcelo longed to reach the leadership organs of the party; Salgueiro has never admitted it; Fontouro, the professional politician, wants power. The new political directorate satisfies everyone and no one, since no undisputed and universally accepted leadership has been defined.

The real country has nothing to do with this petty bickering. It is admittedly certain, incidentally, that what concerned the party "notables" was not the country--it was the party. The country has been completely indifferent to the Social Democratic stew. The party has become even more divided, completely broken to bits.

The next act will unfold in similar fashion, Machete is sure to cling to power like a shipwrecked sailor clinging to the cable of a cutter; he will expand his group, distributing favors and sinecures. Salgueiro is sure to continue to brood over lost opportunities; frantically, Marcelo will try to scramble up the ladder until he reaches the top rung. The struggle continues--Machete is taking it to the streets, which he commands now.

Meanwhile, Portugal is growing weaker. Soares is snoozing and Eanes is contemplating. It is already known that the armed forces, the mirror of the nation, are deeply divided. The possibility of a Firmino Miguel candidacy would divide them even further. Things have reached the point where a military candidacy with some respectability will not be possible because the parties don't want one, and a civilian candidacy will be inviable because the politicians cannot reach agreement.

The whole situation, then, means that we continue to live worse, while the politicians divert themselves with their sport: a blow here, a thrust there, a stab at me. There is not much point in dissecting the phenomenon. The blood that flows is not theirs; it is ours.

6362

CSO: 3542/126



POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

POL: COMMUNISM POOR MODEL FOR PORTUGAL

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 24 Feb 85 p 7

[Article by Nuno Cintra Torres]

[Text.] The survey on the Portuguese opinion of communism was conducted between 22 January and 12 February 1985. There were 995 respondents, representative of the population over 18 years of age residing in all areas of the mainland. NORMA was responsible for the field work and information processing.

The communist countries of the East are not a model for Portugal, it may be concluded from the NORMAL survey conducted for the Radio Comercial program "Cross-fire" and published exclusively by DIARIO DE NOTICIAS. In fact, only 3.5 percent of the Portuguese over 18 years of age consider the communist countries to be the "best model for Portugal." In contrast, 35.4 percent of the Portuguese believe that the Western capitalist countries constitute the best model to follow and 13.7 percent do not accept either group of countries as a model. Typically, the number of respondents who had no opinion or who gave no answer is high: over 30 percent for the survey as a whole.

Communism as the project for the future does not, in this survey, appear to have the sympathy of most Portuguese. In fact, only 11 percent of the adult population agree that "communism is the future," whereas 63 percent disagree and 26 percent express no opinion. Surprisingly, a large portion of respondents in this survey who declared themselves to be communist sympathizers also disagree that communism is the future. Only 36 percent of the communist sympathizers hold this conviction, whereas 47 percent disagree.

However, if the Portuguese look with little sympathy on what we could call "foreign" or "theoretical" communism, the sympathy for the Portuguese Communist Party [PCP] reached levels similar to the vote received by the party in the parliamentary elections. It is observed that 21.8 percent of those interviewed said they had considerable or some sympathy with the PCP. Sympathy for the other parties appeared to be distributed as follows: 27.2 percent for the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party]; 34.4 percent for the PSD [Social Democratic Party]; and 40.5 percent for the PS [Socialist Party]. The total comes to more than 100 percent because the respondents could name more than one party; the same is true of several other questions in this survey.

In this light, it is only natural that 57 percent of the Portuguese are of the opinion that the PCP should be permitted and only 12 percent believe it should be banned. By an odd coincidence, 12 percent also believe that Salazar did the right thing to arrest the communists, as against 49 percent who thought he was wrong. However, 38 percent had no opinion as to whether he was right or wrong.

The opinion of the Communist Party's contribution to the economic and social situation is not enthusiastic. On the contrary, 17 percent of the respondents thought it was very negative, 37 percent saw it as neither positive nor negative and only 5 percent thought it was very positive. Not even the communist sympathizers appeared to be very happy with the actions of the PCP, since only 16 percent of them thought they were positive; 65 percent rated them between positive and negative. Obviously, those who support the other parties are more inclined to very negative opinions, and the greatest number of these (32 percent) were PSD sympathizers.

One of the surprises in this survey was the verification of the broad extent to which the communist countries have a poor image among the Portuguese people. To 40 percent of the Portuguese, they are totalitarian countries; to 38 percent, they are not democratic; and 34 percent think they have concentration camps. As many other Portuguese think the workers in the communist countries are not well paid, that there is privilege, that there are poor people and rich people and that the people there are not free. However, about 15 percent of the respondents believed that none of this was true of the communist countries. Nonetheless, even among the communist sympathizers there are those who think the communist countries are totalitarian (37 percent), that there are concentration camps (21 percent), that there is poverty (43 percent) or that they are not democratic (17 percent).

In the Greater Lisbon and Greater Porto areas, the negative view of the communist countries is even more extensive than the national average. For example, in Greater Porto, 54 percent of the respondents considered those countries to be totalitarian.

On the positive side and indicating that the Portuguese have an idea of the place occupied by the communist countries in the world, a good percentage of the respondents (42 percent) thought the communist countries were developed. In fact, since they are not a part of the so-called Third World, they can only be included in the group of developed countries.

Regarding the Portuguese communists, there are more shades of opinion and some contradictions. Almost all the respondents, 85 percent, feel the communists are Portuguese like any other citizens, although almost half of those interviewed (43 percent) think the communists defend Russia's interests. The secretary general of the PCP seems to be a case apart.

Asked if they considered Alvaro Cunhal to be a "good" or "bad Portuguese," a surprising 47 percent of the Portuguese responded that they did not know or did not answer the whole question. Even among communist sympathizers, at least 17 percent had doubts in this regard, since they replied that they did not know.



However, more Portuguese (31 percent) consider Cunhal a "good" Portuguese than the number (21 percent) who consider him a "bad" Portuguese. Only 1.4 percent gave what might be the most obvious answer: that he is a "Portuguese like the rest."

A significant number of the respondents disagreed with the description of the communists as "enemies of liberty," but almost as many (37 percent) also disagreed that they are "defenders of democracy." In the opinion of 39 percent of the respondents, the communists want to "take property away from the owners" and 37 percent feel they are the "enemies of religion."

Some 37 percent of Portuguese over the age of 18 think the communists "defend the interests of the country," but almost the same percentage (31 percent) felt they had "destroyed the country." Although 43 percent of the Portuguese feel the communists only defend the interests of the Communist Party, almost the same number (42 percent) believe that they "defend the interests of the workers and industrial labor."

Do we have here a statistical identification of communist party with factory worker?

Or is this rather a confirmation that the Communist Party is seen more in a syndicalist perspective, as a bargaining organization, than as representing a political and social alternative?

This last hypothesis gains credibility not only from the foregoing data but also from the analysis of other responses, for example, the finding that 36 percent of those who believe that the phrase which best defines a communist is "defender of the workers and industrial labor" are communist sympathizers themselves. Only a small number of communist sympathizers (18 percent) believe that a communist is best defined as "one who thinks in accord with Marxist communist ideology."

The description of the communists as "defenders of the workers and industrial labor" was the one which won the greatest consensus (70 percent) among the communist sympathizers. Inversely it was among the CDS, PSD and PS sympathizers that the largest number of respondents defined the communists by their ideology and not by the supposition that they defend the workers and industrial labor.

Even more indicative that large sectors of the population see the PCP primarily as a bargaining organization, and not as representing a program for the future of Portugal, is the fact that only 8 percent of the communist sympathizers themselves consider that the phrase which best defines a communist is to be a "registered member of the PCP." In other words, 92 percent of communist sympathizers do not believe that this is the best definition of a communist.

Another interesting segment of the questionnaire is the assessment of the communists' possible role in three great events. Only 26 percent of the Portuguese saw the communists as responsible for the 25 April revolution. In comparison with the other parties, it is among the communist sympathizers that the largest number of respondents (36 percent) believe the communists were responsible for 25 April. Very few respondents (27 percent) believe the communists were responsible for the decolonization, but 46 percent of the CDS sympathizers impute

the decolonization to the communists. There is greater unanimity regarding the nationalizations. Almost half the Portuguese, 43 percent, think the communists were responsible. Among the communist sympathizers themselves, 45 percent, more than the national average, agree with this theory.

For all these questions, a average of 30 percent of the respondents had no opinion or did not reply. Therefore, by simple subtraction from 100 percent, it is possible to determine the other percentages.

Table 1: Response to question: "Is communism the future?"

<u>Response</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Agree	11
Disagree	63
No opinion	26

Table 2: Opinion on statements describing the communist countries.

<u>Statement</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
They are developed countries.	42	16	42
They are totalitarian.	40	15	45
There are concentration camps.	34	15	51
They are democratic.	20	38	42
There are no rich people.	17	44	39
There are no poor people	14	47	39
The workers are well paid.	14	33	53
The people do not want for anything.	10	47	43

Table 3: Respondents' sympathy with political parties.

<u>Party</u>	<u>Great</u>	<u>Some</u>	<u>None</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
PCP	6	16	52	26
CDS	10	17	43	28
PSD	7	27	39	27
PS	14	27	34	25

Table 4: "What is the best model for Portugal?"

<u>Response</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Western capitalist countries	35.4
Eastern communist countries	3.5
Others	2.6
None	13.7
No opinion	40.5
No response	4.2

Table 5: Opinion of Statements Describing the [Portuguese] Communists (percent)

<u>Statement</u>	Agree	Disagree	No Opinion
They are Portuguese like the others.	83	4	13
They are disciplined.	50	19	31
They defend Russian interests.	48	22	30
They only defend the interests of the PCP.	43	27	30
They are responsible for the nationalizations.	43	23	34
They defend the interests of the workers.	42	28	30
They want to take property away from owners.	39	31	30
They are the enemies of religion.	37	35	28
They do not defend the nation's interests.	33	37	30
They defend democracy.	32	37	31
They are enemies of freedom.	32	40	28
They destroyed the country.	31	41	28
They are generous.	30	35	35
They were responsible for the decolonization.	27	40	33
They were responsible for 25 April.	26	44	30

6362

CS0: 3542/127

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

POLL: INCREASINGLY QUALIFIED PSD MAJORITY

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 16 Feb 85 p 13

[Text] Today Mota Pinto departs the NORMA/SEMAMARIO polls on the legislative elections, leaving the PSD [Social Democratic party] still the first party in the nation: first, but with fewer votes than it won in the 1983 elections; first, but on a descending curve. In short, first, because the PS [Socialist Party] slipped even further and continues to slip. Thus the year begins unhappily for the coalition and also for the APU [United People's Alliance], with the good news reserved for the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] and "others."

Votes come; votes go. If the polls were actually elections, NORMA would be provoking a dance of deputies in Sao Bento every month. The results published here today refer to the surveys conducted between 14 and 21 January. Compared with the December surveys, they show the PSD, PS and APU declining and a noticeable recovery for the CDS.

The volubility of the citizens or the influence of the plus or minus 4 percent error rate acknowledged in the technical description of the survey notwithstanding, it is certain that, in December, the trends were precisely the opposite; the majority parties were recovering and the CDS experienced a real disaster.

In short, for the beginning of the year, give or take a point, the poll presents us with three major national parties surprisingly close to each other. The APU is separated from the PS by 1 percentage point and the PS is 1.6 percentage points behind the PSD, while a fourth party is a good many notches below. However, the big parties appear inclined to become less big--at around 20 percent--whereas the small one has gained 2 points since April 1983. The coalition is down 15.6 points and even the opposition APU lost votes.

All First

As a result of these movements, the survey suggests the novelty of giving first place to everyone, considering the vote by cities. Thus, the PSD, leading the national average with 22.9 percent, leads only in Lisbon and Coimbra; the

PS leads in Porto (in December, it was the APU) and in Vila Real; the APU holds on to Evora, and the CDS breaks its pattern by winning in Viseu (where the PSD, which officiated in December, dropped suddenly to third place).

It is all very confusing.

#### PSD; Final Picture Poor

After the relaunching following the renegotiation of the agreement with the PS--which gave it a good boost in December--the PSD lost 2.3 points, and Viseu, in 1 month. Only Porto and Vila Real resisted the general trend away from the Social Democratic Party, which now makes its best showing in Vila Real (27.5 percent) and its worst in Evora (11.7 percent).

Also in relation to the 1983 election results, the final graph for the PSD under Neta Pinto's leadership showed a generally downward curve, except for Lisbon.

#### PS: Eroded but Not Disarmed

Running out of breath after December--which broke the persistent downward trend--the party has resumed its downward path, declining 13.7 points since the last elections. In the last few months it has lost 2.2 percentage points, losing a little everywhere in the country except in Porto, where it recovered. It is also true that the PS had made a particularly poor showing in Porto in previous surveys.

Victorious in the six listed cities in 1983, the PS today only holds on to Porto and Vila Real. It is second in Viseu (behind the CDS) and third in Lisbon, Coimbra and Evora.

As in the case of the PSD, it is in Evora that the PS made the worst showing (16 percent) and it made the best showing in Vila Real (30.4 percent). Vila Real and Evora, then, are the pro- and anti-coalition champions.

#### APU/Porto Returns to Normal

Having lost 3 points from December to January, the APU has fallen behind the position it achieved in April 1983, but not far behind and not everywhere. Worse off in Lisbon, Evora and Vila Real, the communists have advanced in the last 2 years in Coimbra, Viseu and Porto. In Porto, however, it has suddenly dropped to third place, after having been first in two consecutive surveys; in contrast, it is now in second place in Lisbon, where for a long time it was running even with the Socialists. The APU is fourth in Coimbra, Viseu and Vila Real.

#### Centrists

Fourth place usually went to the CDS. A considerable jump now puts it ahead of all the other parties in Viseu (with 24.9 percent). It came in third in the 1983 elections, beaten by the PSD. Coimbra now gives it an unexpected second place, a decimal point ahead of the PS.

Table : Survey of Six Cities in Portugal in January 1985. Voting Simulation Based on a Matrix of Vote Transfers

Vote	Total for 6 cities			Lisbon		Porto		Coimbra		Evora		Viseu		Vila Real	
	Elect '83	Dec '84	Today	'83	Today	'83	Today	'83	Today	'83	Today	'83	Today	'83	Today
Abstent.	19.0	25.0	24.8	19.8	27.0	17.2	21.1	19.3	22.8	17.3	12.0	23.2	28.7	18.3	22.4
APU	21.1	23.4	20.3	22.6	20.6	17.1	18.7	16.9	18.3	40.3	38.9	6.4	8.0	10.6	9.3
CDS	14.0	13.2	16.2	14.3	16.9	14.3	14.5	13.6	18.7	6.3	12.1	19.8	24.9	11.1	10.1
PSD	24.8	25.2	22.9	23.7	23.0	27.0	23.2	25.7	22.7	21.9	17.7	34.1	21.3	32.3	27.5
PS	35.0	23.5	21.3	33.9	19.7	37.5	25.9	39.4	18.6	26.6	16.0	35.3	22.8	41.3	30.4
Others	3.2	10.4	12.3	3.4	13.9	2.6	7.6	2.3	16.8	2.8	9.8	2.3	17.2	2.5	8.0
Blank/Void	1.9			2.1		1.5		2.1		2.1		2.1		2.2	
Undecided		4.3	7.0		5.9		10.1		4.9		5.5		5.8		14.7
Trends in vote switches (from)															
APU				PS	Abstain	Abstain		Abstain		PS		Others		Others	
				Abstain											
CDS				PSD		Undecided				Abstain		Others		PSD	
				Others		Abstain						Abstain			
PSD				Others		Undecided		CDS		CDS		CDS		Undecided	
				Abstain		Abstain		Abstain		Abstain		Others		Undec/Abs.	
PS				Others		Others		CDS		APU		APU		Others	
				Abstain		Undecided		PSD		CDS		CDS		Undecided	
						Abstain		Others		Others		Others		Abstain	
								Abstain		Undecided		Undec/Abs			
Others				PS		Abstain		Abstain				CDS		Abstain	
												Abstain			

Strengthened almost throughout the country, the party of Lucas Pires has some reason to look forward with enthusiasm to its congress next weekend.

In relation to the last legislative elections, however, the most notable progress continues to be shown by the "other" parties--those which are not represented in the parliament today--which have gone from 3.2 percent to nothing less than 12.3 percent. Whether this dissatisfaction will work in favor of the announced Fanist party remains to be seen in the next NORMA/SEMANARIO survey.

#### Technical Note

Universe: Portuguese population over 18 years of age, residing in the cities of Coimbra, Evora, Lisbon, Porto, Vila Real and Viseu.

Sample size: 606 individuals

Sample: Random, stratified by city, non-proportional.

Selection: Random, by the "random route" method for selection of households and by the Kish method for selection of the individual to be interviewed within the household.

Sample points: Starting points selected in six cities.

Field work: Interviews conducted within period between 13 and 21 December 1984.[sic]

Margin of error: For the total, the error is + or - 4 percent with 95 percent reliability for p = 50 percent.

6362

CS0: 3542/127



POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

RECENT CDS CONGRESS ASSESSED: MOREIRA STRONGER

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 25 Feb 85 pp 4-5

[Article by Fernando Diogo]

[Text] The Sixth Congress of the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] has ended. Of the "troika" that assumed the leadership 2 years ago, only Lucas Pires and Adriano Moreira remain. Azevedo Soares chose Aveiro as the site for a retreat which some considered merely strategic and others saw as an "attitude of great dignity." Whatever his motive, Azevedo has already secured a kind of status, the importance of which only time will tell: it is that of the "moral reserve of the CDS," as one delegate declared. Of Lucas Pires, it can be said that he consolidated his leadership but did not achieve total control of the party. His assumption of the leadership of the Political Commission and Directive Commission is not enough to offset the opposite effects of the new method of electing the National Council. The election of that body by the Hondt method (up to now there has been a single slate), so that all the "preferences" could be represented on it (the expression used by Adriano Moreira to designate sensitivities) was the price paid by Lucas Pires to iron out possible difficulties in the congress.

It was the price paid to Adriano Moreira--this kind of mini-parliament in which everyone who, for one reason or another, contests the leadership of the current CDS president will have a seat.

Calling it a guarantee of CDS unity, Adriano Moreira asserted himself once again as the arbiter of all disputes and, at the same time, he strengthened his power. He drew a "magic circle" around him, a space of respect and reverence. Incidentally, his statement near the end of his speech yesterday in Aveiro, in an atmosphere of near delirium, was symptomatic: "Never, under any circumstances, have I been able to accept being bound to hierarchies of individuals."

In the understanding of some delegates, "there is no longer any doubt that Adriano is the father figure of the CDS." In fact, the influence of the man who many CDS members call the "old gentleman" was felt in all phases of the congress. Paradoxically, however, it was his systematic search for unity and consensus that came to create some of the most lively controversy in Aveiro. There was the case of the inclusion of former Secretary General Vieira de Carvalho on the list of vice presidents of the Political Commission. The secretary general is considered to be very close to Adriano Moreira. His name was

challenged by many sectors which preferred  
It was then that Gomes de Pinho, one of  
offered to give up his place as vice president  
Anacoreta could be on an equal footing.  
of secretary general, replacing Pedro  
everything turned around again. Anacoreta  
that of voting member of the Political

#### Nation Council by Hondt Method

The drawing up of the slates for the National  
spectacle. What was intended to be a friendly  
estranged brothers was, in the end, a  
as the Hondt method was established, all  
selves to drawing up lists. Small and  
locations of the city (preferably in home  
group of 25 "friends" and only much later  
lists. There were the Centrist Youth,  
and the malcontents of one or another group  
were four lists: that of Adriano Moreira  
Organization] and the Federation of Christian  
group of district committees; and, finally

Basilio Horta finally agreed to be the  
Council, when previously he had seen his  
to Lucas Pires. Without the support of  
of the party, Basilio Horta abandoned the  
Political Directorate, investing resources  
a list which, whether he wished or not, was  
Moreira. This did not in the least diminish  
but it did not sit well with many delegates  
mission was the only place to take up the  
positive that he had had no strategy, he  
Without going into the motives, we will  
Horta took on the dispute but not the  
him any possibility of one day becoming  
it may have been his "swan song."

6362

CSO: 3542/127

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

# VAYRYNEN'S COMMENTS ON SOVIET SUB INCURSIONS VIEWED

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 12 Jan 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Without a Pointer"]

[Text] In an interview in HUFVUDSTADSBLADET, Finland's Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen touched upon Swedish-Soviet relations, a subject that has always interested Finnish politicians, much more openly in recent years than over the long haul.

Vayrynen's comments were framed in a tonal register different from that of various other contributions made on the subject. He was noticeably anxious to avoid any trace of a pedantic attitude toward Sweden.

Foreign Minister Vayrynen considers it best to be cautious and to allow Sweden and the Soviet Union to clear up everything by themselves. Of course, diplomatic channels are open to them, but here no outsiders are needed.

He discloses to us, however, that Finland has conveyed to both the Soviets and Sweden a wish for better relations. What the practical implications of this might be, the foreign minister did not go into more closely.

Then the interview came around to the precise causes of the quarrels between Sweden and the Soviet Union, i.e. the border violations.

"We haven't wanted to comment upon the dissension," says Vayrynen, but adds, "outside the official circles a number of opinions have been forthcoming which seem to have caught hold on the Swedish side and to have been heeded in their own [official] analyses."

And what about the submarines, then?

"Certainly our officials can have their own perceptions, but it is not wise to take an official position on these matters."

Since Finland's one neighbor says one thing and the other says another, conflicting thoughts arise, says Vayrynen, and for this reason, too, it is best to be careful and not to comment or take a position.

This is, to be sure, a particularly cautious attitude. There are good reasons to respect it.

It is true, as Vayrynen says, that "outside official circles" there occurs a considerable amount of speculation about Swedish-Soviet relations. What awakens amazement and frank wonder on our side of the Baltic Sea has been that these speculations have to such a high degree inspired mistrust against Swedish points of view.

This has essentially been the case. Statements about border violations have been dismissed as pure fantasies or with other jokes. Insinuations of Swedish paranoia have been made, and so on.

The same thing has gone for Swedish foreign policy. Insinuations have been made that the Swedes react inappropriately toward the Soviets and that an inflammatory public opinion has compelled the government to come down too hard. And comparisons with Finland have been made on the assumption that Sweden in its relations with the Soviet Union should emulate Finland.

This discussion has thus occurred "outside official circles." But it can be pointed out that this is not chitchat among little boys but opinions put out by people with very central positions in Finnish society instead. In certain respects, this applies to the absolutely most central of all people to be found in the Finnish society.

It is not difficult to find addressees for Foreign Minister Vayrynen's exhortations to caution.

12723

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POLITICAL

TURKEY

#### ANKARA NOTE FOCUSES ON PLIGHT OF BULGARIAN TURKS

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 25 Feb 85 pp 1, 13

[Text] Ankara (CUMHURİYET BUREAU) - A note was handed to Bulgaria by the Turkish government about the pressures on Turks living in Bulgaria. Bulgaria's Ankara Ambassador Argir Konstantinov was called to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs yesterday and informed of Turkey's firm stance on the matter. The Bulgarian ambassador refused to answer questions in connection with the note, delivered by the under secretary of the Foreign Ministry, Ambassador Necdet Tezel. The Bulgarian ambassador, who stayed at the ministry for 20 minutes, greeted reporters by saying in Turkish, "Good morning, gentlemen." Striving to appear calm and cheerful, the Bulgarian ambassador answered a number of questions by saying, "There is nothing to say. We are neighboring countries. All is normal and well." Asked whether a note had been delivered, he said, "This is a matter that concerns only us and the Turkish Foreign Ministry and the governments." Another reporter said, "It also concerns the Turkish people. What do you think about the note?" He replied, "I can make no comment on this matter."

The note handed to the Bulgarian government reportedly proposes discussions at the Foreign Ministry level of problems existing between the two countries, including a far-ranging immigration agreement, and indicates that the Bulgarian government's reply is expected as soon as possible.

Minister of State and Deputy Foreign Minister Mesut Yilmaz, who made the announcement about the note, said that Turkish governments had always been concerned for humanitarian reasons with the Turks living in Bulgaria, but that it had always been made clear as well that it was not Turkey's intention to interfere in Bulgaria's internal affairs. Yilmaz, stating that for this reason the Bulgarian government is aware of this thinking by the Turkish side and that matters involving the Turks there had always been taken up in talks between the two governments, added, "As was done in the talks held in recent years between our President and the Bulgarian State Council, concern was also expressed in other earlier contacts at the top level about reports conveyed to Turkish authorities in regard to the Bulgarian Turks, and the hope was expressed that Bulgarian authorities would look into the matter and find a solution."

Yilmaz said reports had appeared in the world press and information had come to the attention of the Turkish government as well to the effect that a nationwide campaign had been launched to get Turks living in Bulgaria to change their names,

that changing Turkish names to Bulgarian names was compulsory and that there were many who had been injured or had died when forced to do this against their will. He continued:

"Even though these reports have been denied by Bulgarian officials, these announcements are far from satisfying to our government. Announcements to the effect that our brother Turks have applied on their own to have their names changed, meanwhile, are hardly credible and only serve to confirm the practice.

"Our dismay, concern and anxiety over events have been stated a number of times. These pressures on our brother Turks in Bulgaria and especially having them change their names to Bulgarian names are a practice that will never condoned."

In a written statement yesterday, Yilmaz noted that failure to be concerned about actions to which the Turks in Bulgaria were subjected or to take the necessary measures was impossible both for his government or any Turkish government ever to follow.

8349

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MILITARY

BELGIUM

PROPOSED MILITARY BUDGET FOR 1985 DETAILED

Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE in French 13 Feb 85 p 3

[Article by R.R.: "Persistent Austerity for Armed Forces"]

[Text] Defense Minister Vreven's 1985 defense budget request for 107.165 billion francs is scheduled for parliamentary review next month. The request includes: 49.666 billion francs for personnel outlays, or 46.4 percent of the budget, down from the 48.9 percent in 1984, a reduction due to a lower inflation rate and no pay increases; 29.606 billion francs for operating funds, or 27.6 percent of the budget versus 26.3 percent in 1984; and 27.891 billion francs for equipment and infrastructure expenditures, or 26 percent of the budget compared with 24.8 percent in 1984.

The proposed defense budget will thus represent 5.7 percent of the total national budget compared with 5.6 percent in 1984, 6.4 percent in 1980, and 7 percent in 1975. It should also be noted that 1984 per capita defense expenditures, estimated in constant 1982 dollars, were 298 dollars in Belgium versus 324 dollars in the Netherlands, 381 in the FRG, 413 in France, and 416 in Great Britain.

The sum of 49.666 billion francs allocated for personnel expenditures includes 27.41 billion for the army, 11.541 billion for the air force, 2.698 billion for the navy, and 2.458 billion for the medical department.

The sum of 29.606 billion francs allocated for operating expenditures includes 13.19 billion for the army, 9.932 billion for the air force, 1.11 billion for the navy, and 1.574 billion for the medical department.

The sum of 27.891 billion francs allocated for equipment and infrastructure expenditures includes 15.638 billion for the army, 5.481 billion for the air force, 2.467 billion for the navy, and 416 million for the medical department.

Personnel

Since 1 October 1979, the civil service work week has been reduced from 40 to 38 hours by a 5 percent increase in personnel. This principle of increasing manpower was not applied, however, to military officers and noncommissioned officers. Hence the impossibility of reducing their work week to 38 hours.



A 5 percent compensatory increase in pay would entail an additional expenditure of 2 billion francs. But the economic recovery law precludes any pay increases before 31 December 1986.

An approved personnel plan called for this shorter work week to become effective on 1 July 1984, but the working group established by the Cabinet on 3 December 1983 has not been able as yet to submit its findings because the knotty problem of the draft's future status has still not been resolved.

Pending determination of what category of youth shall or shall not be subject to compulsory military service, the government decided that, beginning with the class of 1985, draftees extending their term of service would be granted certain financial benefits and be exempt from the mandatory waiting period for receipt of unemployment benefit payments. Incidentally, the defense minister also said he regretted that draftee pay had not been increased since 1972 (75 francs, then 100 francs per day).

#### Operational Activities

The 29.606 billion francs allocated for operating funds includes 9.863 billion earmarked for operational activities as follows:

- a. Army: 1.489 billion francs. This should enable the army to conduct 22 days of field exercises, compared with the 45 days recommended by the joint parliamentary commission and the NATO training standard of 60 days.
- b. Air Force: 6.896 billion francs. These funds should cover approximately 145 flying hours per pilot instead of 180 hours set by the joint commission and the 240 hours prescribed by NATO.
- c. Navy: 824 million francs. This should cover 73 days at sea for one-third of the fleet whereas the standards set by the joint commission and NATO are 83 and 100 days respectively for one-half of the fleet.

#### Procurement and Economic Offsets

On 18 January 1982, the Cabinet approved consolidation of the economic offsets for the following procurement programs: "artillery, HF radios, helicopters, replacement of Mirage 5B aircraft, VHF radios, and motor vehicles." On 1 August 1983, the Cabinet approved the following regional distribution of these consolidated offsets: 56 percent for the Flemish region, 34 to 36 percent for the Walloon region, and 9 to 11 percent for the Brussels region.

Agreements have already been signed on this distribution for the second F-16 aircraft program and part of the artillery program. Staffs of the ministries concerned have also reached agreement on the HF radio and motor vehicle programs. Defense Minister Vreven has stated that the economic offsets still to be negotiated--in the helicopter, VHF radio, HF radio, motor vehicle, and rest of the artillery programs--must "be consistent with the final objective and those partial agreements in force."

## Helicopters

It was not possible to initiate this program in 1984 as initially scheduled. The military requirements have been established but the contracting process could not get under way without giving the interested companies the key to the regional distribution of economic offsets.

## Pegard

The general staff had planned to purchase a 60-million franc boring-milling machine for use in overhauling the army's Leopard tanks. It became necessary to open negotiations with Pegard 1 and Pegard 2, inasmuch as the United States' share will obviously not be forthcoming until after the contract has been signed by Belgian authorities.

## Patriot

Bilateral negotiations between Belgium and the United States are continuing for the purpose of defining the conditions under which Belgium can furnish the personnel and operational facilities for employment of these surface-to-air missile fire units, but without itself financing the acquisition of these missile systems.

## Electronic Countermeasures

The U.S. dollar's rise, the Belgian francs devaluation, and inflation compelled the air force to defer this program (for the F-16 aircraft) so that it could pay its debts for the initial F-16 purchase contract. Funds for electronic countermeasures equipment will probably not be available before 1989.

## Florennes Air Base

The first phase in the construction of facilities to accommodate the first flight of 16 cruise missiles will be completed by late March 1985. Work on support facilities for all 48 missiles is proceeding on schedule. U.S. military personnel and equipment--excluding the missiles or their components--continue to arrive at Florennes. The housing construction problem is still under study. NATO is prepared, however, to halt, modify, or reverse cruise missile deployments, and even withdraw any missiles already on sites, in the event a balanced, equitable, and verifiable arms control agreement is concluded.

8041

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MILITARY

DENMARK

# ANTINUCLEAR WEAPONS GROUP WANTS U.S. FLEET VISIT GUARANTEES

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 12 Feb 85 p 12

[Article: "No To Nuclear Weapons Wants Guarantees from United States on Fleet Visits"]

[Text] Denmark should follow New Zealand's example so that, before visits by American warships to Danish ports, the United States would guarantee that there were no nuclear weapons on board, the organization No To Nuclear Weapons stated in a letter to the government and to parliament.

The statement was triggered by the recent incident involving a naval visit to New Zealand that was rejected by the government of that country because the United States would not guarantee that the destroyer USS Buchanan had no nuclear weapons on board. In connection with this incident, American officials said that Denmark and Norway made no special demands on the American ships.

"We must conclude from this that the United States does not understand the Danish position on nuclear weapons. We must call on the government and parliament to clear up this misunderstanding on the part of the United States immediately," the letter from No To Nuclear Weapons states.

American researcher William Arkin, coauthor of the authoritative handbook Nuclear Weapons Databook which describes American nuclear weapons in detail, confirmed to INFORMATION that the United States offers Denmark no guarantees before fleet visits.

"My sources within the navy say that no statements whatsoever are sent to Denmark beforehand," Arkin said.

No To Nuclear Weapons stated in its letter that, "The parliamentary resolution against nuclear weapons on Danish territory during times of peace also applies to ships, even when they are simply visiting. If there is no guarantee that this demand will be met, then Denmark must inspect all visiting ships that could conceivably carry nuclear weapons."

MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

WOERNER REVIEWS PROBLEMS OF MANPOWER, ARMAMENTS, COOPERATION

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Feb 85 pp 16-22

[Interview with Federal Minister of Defense Manfred Woerner conducted at Bundeswehr headquarters by WEHRTECHNIK publisher Manfred Sadlowski and editor Wolfgang Flume, date not indicated: "If the Two-Way Street Is to Be Taken Seriously, It Must Include the Exchange of Technologies - and We Insist on That"]

[Text] WEHRTECHNIK: The Bundeswehr planning for the next 15 years, and to which you gave your blessing, is surely also oriented to the expected threat. Where does the planning reflect perceived or conjectured changes in the threat?

Woerner: Let me explain this with the aid of two examples. First the example of aerial defense. The Warsaw Pact has converted to air attack some of its air forces of the latest generation of weapons systems initially programmed for defense. Consequently we had to emphasize the priority of air defense and expand it appropriately. We did this by programming the Patriot and Roland systems for the air force.

The second example: The Warsaw Pact introduced new battle tanks, modern battle tanks, and will continue to introduce new ones. We have therefore pushed ahead with the antitank capability of the German Army, and the new generation of armored combat vehicles is tailored to that threat. Incidentally, the same applies to the development of modern ammunition.

Realistic Personnel Planning

WEHRTECHNIK: It was stressed--quite correctly--that the Bundeswehr's defensive strength must under no circumstances be diminished. The Bundeswehr endeavors despite a declining birthrate to maintain in the 1990's, too, the current peacetime strength of 495,000. To realize this goal, you are proposing various measures. Are you not unduly optimistic in your expectations regarding the men to be additionally recruited?

Woerner: I consider these expectations realistic with the proviso that all the measures planned to increase the Bundeswehr's attraction are indeed carried out. Of course nobody now can possibly predict the attitudes of

young people in 1990-1992 or even later, and this of course represents an uncertainty factor in all our programs. However, considering the financial resources we have earmarked in the Bundeswehr program to provide for greater attraction, I think it should be possible to arrive at longer enlistment periods and larger recruitment numbers per entry class.

WEHRTECHNIK: And yet, are you not compelled to compete with industry which also needs skilled personnel?

Woerner: It is true that we need to compete with industry for these people. While nobody can be totally sure, I believe that we can compete successfully if we continue to be attractive by dissolving the seniority backlog or, at a given point in time, pay enlistment bonuses.

WEHRTECHNIK: The opposition has proposed in the 1990's to fix the peacetime strength of the Bundeswehr at 350,000 or even 300,00--precisely due to the personnel problems. Is the sole objection to these proposals merely the expected "domino effect" on other NATO partners? Do not some NATO partners, such as Great Britain, have similarly small fighting forces by operating with a professional army only?

Woerner: Great Britain is not a model for us, simply because that country is an island. We are the country at the border and therefore have a special obligation and a special responsibility. The opposition proposals to drop to 350,000 or 300,000 men are disastrous not only from the aspect of the Alliance. They would mean our abandonment of a coherent advance defense, the corresponding lowering of the nuclear threshold--basically we could no longer envisage the conventional defense of our country. The build-up of the Warsaw Pact's strength for a surprise attack could be set at such a low level that warning and early warning times would drop radically. That, also, would have disastrous consequences for our country, and it would no longer be possible to speak of deterrence! In other words: A strength of 350,000 or 300,000 men makes our country incapable of defending itself.

An American Retreat from Europe Would Be Calamitous--for America, too

WEHRTECHNIK: Although they do not represent the large majority of the FRG population, the actions of our so-called peace friends--obstructions of exercises and frank anti-Americanism--are drawing a good deal of attention on the other side of the Atlantic. Does not the danger arise that, sooner or later, Senator Nunn will prevail with his plans for reducing the U.S. forces in Europe? What consequences would that have for us?

Woerner: The consequences would be calamitous. Europe would be decoupled from the United States. By the way, the consequences would not be disastrous for Europe alone but also for the United States of America. America would give up its world power status, endanger its own security and at some future time be confronted with the same risk it encountered twice before--to be drawn into a world war against its will, simply because it had not been committed in Europe early or adequately enough. The United States of America are defended in Europe, in other words we contribute to the defense of the

United States, just as the Americans defend our country and theirs here in Europe. These are quite obvious connections, and the Americans will have to appreciate them. We share a common fate, and that is not a matter of words alone, our community is documented by the presence of U.S. forces. Only this presence of U.S. forces, including nuclear weapons, will prevent the outbreak of war in future also. Only the commitment to Europe of the superpower United States of America keeps the risk for the Soviet Union great enough--in other words, the presence of U.S. forces is the price the Americans need to pay for preventing world war.

Of course some of Senator Nunn's concerns are quite justified, and we are taking them into account in our own Bundeswehr program just as the Alliance has been doing in its latest decisions. I think that he would now have reason enough to revise his attitude. The actions of our protesters are unavoidable in our democratic country. They receive excessive attention by the media here and on the other side of the Atlantic. We must therefore point out with even greater emphasis that the people involved are a tiny minority of our population. This was quite evident during the exercises. U.S., British and other allied men fully realized that the general public's attitude to the soldiers, in particular the allied soldiers, is perfectly friendly. This has now become common knowledge on the other side of the Atlantic, too, and--as I said before--we will do even more to make sure that this knowledge spreads further yet.

WEHRTECHNIK: Still, you cannot exclude the possibility that some such proposal is put forward in America after all, and that it may receive majority approval?

Woerner: No, we cannot exclude that possibility. However, in view of the fact that we are doing our best, that the Alliance has taken these decisions, that the FRG meets its defense obligations in an exemplary manner (at least in my opinion), and that we need not hide our heads when we compare our burdens with those of the United States of America, it is very likely that, if such a proposal were to be resubmitted, it would again be rejected.

#### No More "Quotas" for Military Services

WEHRTECHNIK: It has often been mentioned that no more fixed slices of the "armament cake" should be allocated to the military services. However, when we take a closer look at the program, the Army will continue on the average to receive 50 percent, the Air Force about 30 percent and the Navy 20 percent of procurement spending, while the yearly figures will fluctuate only very slightly. Does not this amount to the virtual scheduling of follow-up thinking--despite all assertions to the contrary?

Woerner: On the contrary. Once you look at the details, you will see that we have abandoned all thought of quotas. The starting point for stock taking with regard to the plan was the conceptual appraisal of the 1985 Bundeswehr program. It was the objective of this examination to eliminate the acknowledged weaknesses and risks by setting logical sequences of priorities relating to task oriented approaches ranging beyond the military services.



The result of this stock taking reflects this approach by disproportional increases in some sectors--quite independent of the military services--for example reconnaissance, ammunition stockpiling and medical services. Incidentally, the Bundeswehr program does not maintain the division by organizational sectors but is divided into spheres of duties. Some considerable shifts occurred among these spheres of duties toward research and development, toward military facilities (NATO infrastructure) and toward military procurement. Within military procurement, in turn, there were notable shifts (applying to all military services) away from major items of equipment and toward the sectors ammunition stockpiling, telecommunication equipment, medical equipment, drugs and dressings. This presents the following framework for the costs of the program in the sphere of duties military procurement: Comparing the Bundeswehr programs for 1985 and 1986, the increase for the Army will amount to 7.7 percent, for the Air Force to 1.9 percent and for the Navy to 2.5 percent. This clearly shows that the allocation of money in accordance with the framework of program costs did not proceed by quotas but by task-related decisions arising from the stock taking. Neither the observance nor the distribution of quotas to the military services was discussed at any time and, as long as I am responsible for this department, will not be a topic for discussion in future either.

#### New Conception for Reconnaissance

WEHRTECHNIK: Reconnaissance also is a sphere where the Army and the Air Force would have to cooperate far more closely--not to even mention the lack of cooperation in NATO. Would some initiatives from our side be appropriate here?

Woerner: It is quite true that the necessity as well as the opportunity for closer cooperation between the military services of the Bundeswehr and within the Alliance as such seems indicated. I therefore requested the Inspector General to draft a general conception for the sphere of reconnaissance, involving all military services. This will outline the future collaboration of the Bundeswehr's existing and projected reconnaissance resources. Also included will be our ideas about an improved interaction of resources and forces within the Alliance just as the initiatives we ought to take within the scope of the general review.

#### Worries Regarding the NATO Identification System

WEHRTECHNIK: To stay with NATO: Despite the STANAG enacted, NATO is drifting apart with regard to a future identification system. What do you intend to do to persuade the United States, in particular, to abandon its IFF MK 15 which appears ill-suited to European conditions?

Woerner: I will not conceal that this development worries me. Basically unilateral facts have been created which will be hard to change. To begin with we will carry out the tests agreed and then see which system better meets the needs of NATO. Of course the costs of these various systems will also be seriously considered. The Americans maintain that they need to introduce this system worldwide and procure it for all their forces. Accordingly they point



out with some justification that unduly high additional costs have a disproportionate effect on them. At the moment I am still talking to the Americans about this issue, but I will not make a secret of the fact that, according to many indications, the Americans have already substantially made up their minds.

WEHRTECHNIK: Are we therefore to assume the demise of NIS (or CAPRIS as it used to be called in Germany)? Had we not intended to use NIS for the identification of air to ground and ground to ground also?

Woerner: I can say only that I continue to keep on with this issue and have not given up. CAPRIS therefore cannot be said to be dead. I have tried to report the situation with regard to the Americans, without indulging in any illusions, but that does not mean that everything is settled.

WEHRTECHNIK: You achieved a major step forward in direction division of labor by the German-American treaty on the procurement of Roland and Patriot. However, we have now heard that Germany industry will not be involved in the Patriot system with regard to the \$500 million compensation business, and that consequently our Air Force will be totally dependent on the American general contractor for Patriot in the utilization phase. Does not this represent a danger of great and, subsequently, very costly dependence if German industry is unable to take on any support function in the operational phase?

Woerner: All I can say is that you have been misinformed. This is not my idea at all, nor do I think that it will come about. I still assume that the logistic maintenance or, at least a large proportion of logistic maintenance, will be handled by us. This automatically involves a certain insight into the system.

#### We Insist on an Exchange of Technologies

WEHRTECHNIK: Since we are just discussing the United States: What is your appraisal of European-American and, in particular, German-American arms cooperation? The Americans are making every effort to keep new technologies to themselves as much as possible. Does that already have perceptible results?

Woerner: Of course the trend is quite evident but we do not accept it. If we are to take seriously the strategy of the two-way street, the exchange of technologies must be included, and we insist on that.

WEHRTECHNIK: The German arms industry had hoped for a more explicit attitude by the present government as regards exports of defense materiel. What is your personal opinion of arms exports?

Woerner: I am a member of the Federal Government and would urgently advise against making this topic the object of public debate.

Combat Vehicles--Common Planning Term for

WEHRTECHNIK: Let us get back to the point. If a new battle tank, the Army will receive. Why this new designation? Is the word offensive? And is this meant as a concealed

Woerner: This government has made its goals, in disregard of the protest movement with it. We have no need to make. Incidentally, I would like to strongly recommend movement." Rather do as I do and talk of one peace movement among our people, and

As for the core of your question: You are at the two terms--tank and combat vehicle. The word that much more obviously expresses tank. When we talk of tanks, we may speak as an offensive or defensive weapon. In the definition of our weapons systems, I am more than with the opinion of some protesters.

Let us return to the real business: destroyer/antihelicopter combat vehicles. The names of weapons systems are given upon introduction of animal names for armored weapons systems. The overly long and unwieldy designations destroy tanks and attack helicopters at

Secondly: By using combat vehicle as a term to emphasize the concept of a family of weapons systems are to be assigned to one technical

And thirdly: It is not our intention to develop follow-on weapons systems for the armor to replace the present systems. Instead we want to balance the weaknesses of one weapons system. This is to be expressed by the common term. We were at some time to decide for the common term. It really has to be a new tank, and it would

First Priority--Stopping the First Echelon

WEHRTECHNIK: NATO has lately been working on a concept. You, by contrast, have said that the first wave, and only then comes the tank. The fight against hostile air forces on the ground. Does the Bundeswehr program meet your priorities?

Woerner: The Bundeswehr program reflects the concept. It has been approved and submitted it to the German

of priorities. Besides, our information according to the considerations and priorities of SACEUR. The 80-100-000 concept stands in with the overall concept of strengthening conventional defense. This point was either totally ignored or dismissed in the public discussion. It represents a segment of a whole range of measures multiplied by the increase in conventional fighting strength. The increase in fighting power by the provision of adequate ammunition stocks or the reinforcement of, for example, the construction of shelters within the command and the strengthening the infrastructure are examples of additional measures to derive conventional defense capability.

is a concept we support, but there are still the important points that stopping the first echelon has first priority both for the Federal Republic of Germany and the Alliance as a whole, because it would make little sense to fight the second echelon once the first one has reached the front. This fact alone yields a logical sequence of priorities. The second consideration is equally obvious: If at all possible, we must fight the people's all forces on the ground, because this is war and not a defense situation, consequently this is certainly the second priority. It is followed by the fight against the second echelon. In the case of war (hopefully it will never happen), all three of course operate parallel to each other, it is said that resources must be allocated consonant with these priorities. Still, let us repeat once more: In this respect we do not have any fundamental differences of opinion with SACEUR.

WEHRTECHNIK: How is the reinforcement of the conventional defense now and in future? Are the systems planned up to now, such as TOW and LA-SOM adequate? Can you imagine "counter air" as a system not by ballistic missiles?

Woerner: We are just now studying and considering many options. They include the one you mention. No decision has yet been taken. In fact it could not have been taken because that would require the settlement of many technological, financial and also political questions.

#### Financial Resources Programmed for the Conventional Defense

WEHRTECHNIK: It seems that today's estimate for the cost of the AWAC 5 years before the procurement program. May there not be some future similar and now not even foreseeable NATO program which we would have to keep finance, for example "JSTAR" and "AXF"?

Woerner: In my capacity as Chairman of the Defense Committee I have repeatedly objected to the fact that financial programming for AWAC did not proceed until shortly before the beginning of the procurement, especially because the approximate amount of 2 billion DM was not predictable some 2 years earlier. Furthermore, my predecessor had before a situation in which he had obligated himself to provide some resources for this purpose. He was kind enough to come to me the day of my appointment and say:

I concluded from this experience that it is imperative more intensively to observe what is going on in NATO and, in good FOFA , coordinate evolving procurement programs with national planning.

JSTAR and AXE, incidentally, are systems still in the stage of preplanning in the United States. Neither of them is concretely considered in our Bundeswehr program. Consequently, if it were necessary to accommodate them, we would have to have serious negotiations betimes. At the present moment I see no necessity for any of this.

I have planned for 15 years, but in some sectors the systems are not yet defined. Of course finances have been adjusted, for example in the reconnaissance sector. However, we have not yet concretely planned them by systems, because some of the systems are not yet available. The same applies to the ammunition sector. I have planned a lot of money for the ammunition sector; the rates of increase are steep indeed. At the same time I need not tell you that the standoff weapons do not even exist now though the money has been earmarked. In other words, we left elbow room in the Bundeswehr program for discernible developments in the technological sector because we wish to avail ourselves of modern equipment as soon as it is available, for example to improve the chances for fighting the second echelon.

#### Better Research Coordination

WEHRTECHNIK: You have advocated more money for research and development--that has been generally and gratefully acknowledged. Are there not some possibilities in the research and development sector to better utilize the money spent by achieving closer coordination with the BMFT [Federal Ministry for Research and Technology]? The situation in this respect was poor in the past, due probably to political reservations regarding military research. Will you commit yourself to closer cooperation?

Woerner: Of course I have done so already. We are also about to talk in concrete terms with the Federal Minister for Research and Technology. Still, that is not the only problem. There are others, too. We also lacked the necessary close cooperation with industry. No one without a well defined research and technology concept is able to provide industry with appropriate guidelines. This is all over now. I set particular value by an active coordination of our research and technology operations, not only with the BMFT and the other departments but equally with industry and research. No week passes without personnel from my ministry conducting intensive talks on coordination. In future, the research and technology concept of the defense department will permit us to concentrate defense technical research and technology operations on key points and thus lead to a significant improvement in the efficiency of the use of resources and the reinforcement of industry's own initiatives. Already I have to hand the draft of a first research and technology guideline which will represent the hard core of the research and development concept.

### The Best Man at the Respective Place

WEHRTECHNIK: The military services are definitely endeavoring to exert greater influence on armament by means of their personnel. Is that not liable to threaten armament's independence of the military services, including its function as a neutral technical adviser?

Woerner: I am not aware of such efforts. In case they do exist, I can only tell you that they will not be successful. I stick to the three pillars in my department, but that certainly does not mean that I should refrain from employing civilian officials in the military sector and soldiers in the civilian sector. The best man at the respective place is still my motto and will continue to be so. It does not matter whether he does or does not wear a uniform.

I consider it an outstanding factor that we have more and more technical experts available in the military sector also. This is bound to be useful for the Bundeswehr and defense as a whole. I do not believe that it should be considered from the aspect of the narrow classifications of department internal jealousies. Instead we should regard it as the reflection of reasonable coexistence, the principle of dialogue as desired by us.

WEHRTECHNIK: We are sometimes asked abroad whether there is still such a thing as an arms department in Germany. People had heard talk of Emcke's proposals for a reorganization of the arms sector. Now your state secretary, Professor Dr Timmermann, is planning a reorganization. What is intended, what to be improved? To what extent are the BWB and the armament agencies in the military services affected by the reorganization envisioned?

### Armament Section Need not Fear Comparison

Woerner: To begin with: When you are asked such questions abroad, answer by asking in return whether things are going better there. After 2 years in office, it is my impression that, as to quality, our armament section need not fear comparison with any foreign armament section.

Secondly: State Secretary Professor Timmermann who has now found his feet, has indeed some ideas about some reorganization of the armament section. I consider this one of his tasks, but I have no intention of discussing it in public before it has been coordinated and decided on in the ministry.

11698

CSO: 3620/268



MILITARY

GREECE

'PRE-ELECTORAL' OFFICER'S PAY INCREASE

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 9 Feb 85 p 16

[Text] The premier, Mr. Papandreou, promised yesterday a special pay scale for the officers of the Armed Forces. In fact he presided at a Pentagon conference in which qualified ministers and leaders of the armed forces participated.

The conference lasted one and a half hours, and as the premier himself disclosed, the officers' pay scale was its topic.

The alternate minister of national defense, Mr. Drosyannis, who spoke afterwards, made the following statement:

"The pay scales fall within the government's concerns and that is why the premier presided at today's conference. The pay scales will be established following the completion of the necessary formalities between the Ministries of National Defense and Finance. To this end, we will consult with Mr. Tsovolas and I believe that very soon we will be in a position to make a definite announcement."

"Uniform Scale" Abolished

The decision of the premier, Mr. Papandreou, to establish a special pay scale for officers is interpreted by the opposition circles as a pre-election offering, but also as the effective abolition of the much-touted "uniform pay scale." It is noted that already, with the various "special pay scales," the government is trying to correct its errors. With the difference that when those steps are taken during a pre-election period they constitute a shameful course of action.

12278  
CSO: 3521/190



MILITARY

GREECE

#### GREEK READINESS AGAINST TURKISH ATTACK EMPHASIZED

Athens ETHNOS in Greek 10 Feb 85 p 7

[Article by St. Kalogeropoulou "Any Turkish Operation in The Aegean Doomed"]

[Text] The recent maritime tragedy north of Samos, where a large Turkish transport ship loaded with tanks, vehicles for the transportation of personnel and a unit of marines sank, made a deep impression in the Greek Ministry of Defense circles as it gave a measure of the Turkish forces' stepped-up training in the field of amphibious operations.

Three other "Dolmus" ships (of the same type as the one that sank) were to carry out an extensive landing operation under the cover of the Air Force and the Navy at Dogabey, simulating the invasion of a Greek island.

According to information provided by captains of Greek patrol ships, aside from the other massive means of support, units of submarine destroyer ships whose mission is to prepare for the landing of forces on shore, also took part in that stage of the "Deniz Kurdu" [Sea Wolf] exercise.

The selection of the Dogabey coast for the Turkish forces' exercise in landing operations was not by chance, since its geographical outlines are similar to those of Samos, Mytilene, Symi and Rhodes.

Besides, according to GEN [Naval General Staff] data, before their intervention in Cyprus, the Turks had carried out three landing exercises on the Dogabey coast in 1974.

#### Islands Targeted

Consequently, the application of the Turkish Staff's expansion scheme in the Aegean is combined in its first stage with training crack units in the practice of landing and amphibious operations, with the definite intention of occupying a Greek island.

Furthermore, it is with this aim in view that a landing fleet consisting of 135 ships, under the direct command of the 4th Aegean Army whose headquarters are in Izmir, is moored in the bays of Izmir and Makris.

The structure of this army group differs from other Turkish military forces.

and that is why its backbone is constituted of marine and parachute units. In addition to those combat units, all the coast artillery batteries assigned to precision firing against islands within a short distance of Turkish shores also come under the jurisdiction of this army command.

The controversial question in this instance is whether the Turks really have the capacity for a surprise raid on a Greek island such as Lesbos, Chios, Samos or Rhodes from the coast of Asia Minor.

A clear reply to that lies in the Greek counterplan for repulsing Turks in the Aegean which, of course, has no relation whatever to the anachronistic cry of: "We shall fight to the death defending our borders."

There is no possibility whatever for Turkey today to conceal its military preparations and concentrations aimed at occupying a Greek island.

Also there is no airport today on the Turkish mainland which is beyond the striking range of the Greek Air Force, or a naval base on the shores of Asia Minor which is not under threat by the Greek fleet.

NATO's scary warnings that Turkey has 100 carrier aircraft which can convey 3000 parachutists on one mission to establish pockets on an Aegean island, as was the case in Cyprus, belong to military history. To begin with, on the defenseless island of Cyprus, what took place was a real military walkover which would have had grievous consequences for the invader, however, if Greece had only had 30 long range aircraft.

Cyprus is barely 40 miles distant from Turkey's southern coast and a full 150 miles from Greece.

The alternate minister of defense, Mr. Antonis Drosoyannis, who has served as an active duty and staff army officer, openly declares that Turkey itself no longer believes in a successful landing like that on Cyprus, because from now on there will be no international conjunction of circumstances favoring an operation in the Aegean.

The Greek islands which are a stone's throw from the Turkish shores, due to their being concentrated in the Aegean and to their having been fortified, have been turned into veritable fortresses against any attack.

And from that standpoint, it would not be easy to establish a bridgehead, especially for the Turkish army which by its very nature is averse to amphibious operations. In military history there is no mention of landings, even by powerful armies, which did not exact a high price for such attempts.

A small Turkish and German force in the Dardanelles in 1915 threw back into the sea an entire allied army which had been unable to establish a foothold on the coast.

Something of the sort would have happened also in Normandy if the Germans had had first class troops instead of old reserve draftees.

Nonetheless, the allies' nightmarish losses during the landing operations are well known.

An eventual Turkish landing on an Aegean island requires gigantic preparations on the Turkish shores and at airfields, which would not escape the vigilance of the electronic surveillance system in the Aegean.

#### The Scanners

And the electronic scanners on the two frigates "Limnos" and "Elli" alone are able to comb installations and movements in the whole of eastern Turkey in great depth. The islands' defense is clearly aimed at preventing surprise [attacks] because from there on the game turns into diversionary attacks on the enemy's own territory instead of the classical border clashes foreseen by outdated schemes.

Therefore, this is why in the last analysis the landing exercises in Dogabey are meant to be nothing less than a concrete application of a surprise attack against Greek islands which, naturally, does not escape the attention of the Greek Navy and Air Force

Turkish Army Staff luminaries must be naive, to say the least, if they believe that exercises of the "Sea Wolf" type are perceived by the Greek side as routine readjustments, especially when they coincide with deliberate violations of Greek territory and infringements of the "Athens FIR" [Flight Information Region] by the Turkish Air Force. The GEETHA [National Defense General Staff] speculates that Turkey, through its frequent air and sea exercises, aims to reduce Greek aerial and maritime territory from 10 to 6 miles as a first step, and subsequently to impose administrative control of the Aegean, in accordance with preconceived Turkish-NATO plans.

Therefore the coordinated mobilization of the Navy and Air Force in the face of the Turkish attempt once again to raise the temperature in the region of the Aegean should be viewed as extremely encouraging from every aspect.

#### The Warning

The latest stern warning to Ankara makes it clear that these provocative infiltrations into Greek territory are pregnant with very grave dangers, and that is why the Turkish Staff is invited to face up to its responsibilities.

The broader picture of today's situation is that the Turks have not ceased to view themselves as the heirs to the Aegean since the time of the Ottoman empire and that is why they will always seek opportunities to achieve this aim.

In view of the foregoing, at a recent meeting of the GEETHA at which the premier was also present, Air Force General Kiouris categorically explained the necessity for the Aegean Armed Forces to be on a constant state of alert with a high degree of preparedness in all its branches and formations.

General Kiouris, who also served as chief of the GEA [Air Force General Staff], assured the premier and his colleagues on a staff basis that the carefully cultivated rumors of the superiority of the Turkish Air Force are nothing but a well-orchestrated NATO myth which has no repercussions whatever within the corps of our flying officers.

"We have the advantage as regards the level of our flying personnel, the skill of our experienced technicians and the quality of our materiel, about which even NATO has no doubts," General Kiouris emphasized. Just about the same points were noted in relation to the other two arms, which are in a position today to fulfill their mission totally.

12278

CSO: 3521/190

MILITARY

SWEDEN

#### JAS GETTING UNIQUE DOMESTICALLY DESIGNED CONTROL SYSTEM

Stockholm NY TEKNIK in Swedish 22 Nov 84 pp 1, 30, 31

[Article by Sven Olof Carlsson and Mikael Holmstrom]

[Text] Swedish Engineer Behind Unique Control Stick

JAS [combined fighter-bomber-reconnaissance plane] pilots will be learning to fly with an entirely new computerized control system.

A ministick with fingertip sensitivity and a new electrical system gives the pilot unique maneuvering capabilities.

The system is entirely Swedish and has been tested by American test pilots with the private testing firm, Arvin Carlspar; the pilots have given the ministick top marks.

NY TEKNIK has test flown the stick in the JAS simulator in Linkoping.

#### A New Way of Flying

JAS pilots will be getting an entirely new control stick with unique properties. The design is entirely Swedish. The pilot will have fingertip sensitivity in all elements of control, whether it involves big rapid turns or precision flying.

In contrast to all previous Swedish fighter planes JAS will have an entirely electrical control system. Even reserve functions will be controlled with electrical signals. The electrical system is one of the prerequisites for such a light airplane that includes the functions of fighter-bomber and reconnaissance plane in one aircraft.

The electrical control system in JAS has a number of important advantages compared to earlier mechanical or combined electrical-mechanical (Viggen) systems: less weight, less need for space, separate reserve lines, mass-produced electronics and simpler maintenance and troubleshooting.

In contrast to the American F-16, for example, which has the control stick located on the right, the JAS has a control stick for all important functions

located between the pilot's knees. The same is true of the Viggen. The idea is that a pilot with an injured right arm could fly the plane home with his left hand.

The JAS will have another stick on the left side of the cabin. With this the pilot can use two natural hand positions to perform a dozen regulations of thrust, radar, communication, etc.

The Viggen and most other fighter planes have three or more sticks to take care of all functions. The JAS will have only two and without letting go of them the pilot can handle all vital functions during a flight assignment.

The JAS control stick will be a ministick, with the moving part being only about 1 decimeter high. The pilot's hand covers almost the entire stick. The Viggen stick is a half meter long so that the pilot can control the electro-mechanical system.



This is how the intense, aesthetically-oriented control stick looks. In the big picture test pilot Ole Holmstrom is sitting in a flight simulator while the designer of the control stick, Bengt Lundberg, looks on.



JAS spaken är kort. Större delen ryms i handen. Den undre fasta delen ger handen stöd och en referens vid spakrörelserna.



The JAS stick is short. The pilot's hand covers most of it. The lower fixed portion supports the hand and serves as a reference for stick movements.

#### Transmits Electrical Signals

The movable part of the JAS ministick is mounted on a fixed base section. The fixed portion, which supports the hand, contains mechanical and electronic elements that transmit stick movements to the control system in the form of electrical signals.

These mechanical and electronic elements are controlled in turn by computer which gives the ministick its unique control properties--exactness to the millimeter in precision control combined with a maximum of control effect with a minimum of handpower in the most comprehensive maneuvers.

With a traditional control stick one gets either good fine steering and awkward big turns or flexible stick control for the big turns and poor fine steering which provides less precision and less stability in the air.

The new ministick has the combination of properties that is lacking in other control sticks: good fine steering combined with flexibility in big rapid turns. The combination is due to special nonlinear steering functions (see section at end of article under the heading "Electronic Transmission").

Designers and test pilots at Saab have made extensive simulator tests of the ministick. The tests show that the stick can give pilots top marks on the international scale that measures pilots' steering capabilities in different flight situations. This includes both simple and highly advanced maneuvers under difficult circumstances.

The ministick has been used "in flight" in a special simulator that tests stick development among other things. There the stick controls an ideal JAS

with the properties that will be built into the future JAS airplanes. The stick has also been tested in the simulator used for the development of instruments and maneuvering for the JAS-39.

The ministick has also been tested about 30 times in a real airplane in the air. The flight tests were conducted in the United States by a private testing firm, Arvin Calspan. The test plane was an older jet-propelled T-33 and the American test pilots gave the ministick top marks. This is worth noting, since the Americans have had poor experiences with the control stick of such planes as the F-16, which they are trying to redesign.

The ministick has been developed by leaps and bounds. Today they are working on the seventh generation, which will probably be used in the trial JAS plane when it takes off for the first time in 1987.

The construction of the control stick makes it possible to adapt the stick functions to each pilot (different individual pilots with varying sensitivity and muscular strength can adjust the stick in entirely different ways).

The inventor of the ministick, Lennart Nordstrom, believes the ministick can be used for many other purposes besides military combat planes.

In the military it could be used in helicopters, rapid surface craft or minisubs as well as all kinds of terrain vehicles.

In civilian life it could be used in cranes and manipulating devices, excavators, race cars and also ordinary cars. For example it could be used in vehicles for the handicapped where traditional steering techniques have to be abandoned anyway.

"This is a system with many building blocks. In civilian applications one can choose the properties one needs for a specific machine, such as an excavator or a car for a handicapped person. I have already talked to people who are working on civilian production and think the cost can be reduced substantially," said inventor Lennart Nordstrom.

He said there are already people interested in civilian uses of the device.


#### NY TEKNIK Test Flies JAS

NY TEKNIK's reporters have flown the JAS several years before the airplane will be ready for its first test flights. We flew in one of the JAS simulators. We used the new ministick and for purposes of comparison we also tried out a Viggen simulator.

The simulator flights were made to give us some idea of how the stick functions and of the technical development the ministick will involve compared to the control systems in the Viggen or Draken, for example.

The simulator center at Saab's airplane division in Linkoping is a very protected area that is extremely difficult to gain access to. Here the designer

of the ministick, civil engineer Lennart Nordstrom, works daily through one test flight after another. The simulator looks simple but it has an advanced and appropriate computer technology.



Saab's test pilot Stig Holmstrom seated at the simulator that tests control sticks, among other things. A Gould computer is used to give the simulator the many different stick function alternatives and flight situations. The machine in the background provides a moving picture of the plane's surroundings.

### Surprising

It was really first when we sat in the pilot's seat in the simulator that we recognized the advantages of the stick. The difference was obvious even to someone unused to flying a plane. Of course there was a difference between the JAS and Viggen simulators, but this was also true when the JAS simulator's stick sensitivity and moment gradient were changed (see section on "Electronic Transmission").

Lennart Nordstrom has had to convince people on a very practical level of the ministick's properties.

"I don't think many people understand how an airplane," Lennart Nordstrom said. "

"It has not been hard to convince pilots control stick. Even though they would not know the function and whose movements they understood, convincing the Saab engineers who are in charge

Lennart Nordstrom is low-voiced and unassuming. Saab probably did not know that he was in the division in Linköping. This in spite of his being there back in 1946. And except for brief stints at the Technology Research Institute, and American universities as MIT and Harvard University, he has been

The ministick is the fruit of Lennart Nordstrom's ideas for steering vehicles. For a futurist in nature with no connection with

to meet the special low-weight requirements of the Viggen, the JAS had to be a new system. And a new stick to control the system.

Lennart Nordstrom then defended his idea

His arguments were convincing enough that the Swedish airplane technology development. Technical ideas.

They were Lennart Nordstrom's concept of a cell-phone-size control stick of a more traditional


#### First Place

The contest took place at the end of 1981. The winner had been given 1 year and a million kronor to produce their working test models.

Nordstrom's ministick was not given much of a chance by Saab's control system experts.

Both sticks were hooked up to a simulator. The ministick was used in a number of operations where the pilots had to judge how the pilot and the stick performed.

All six pilots got better results with the ministick. And Saab's control system technicians and engineers decided to invest in the ministick.



Reportage  
SVEN OLOF CARLSSON  
MIKAEL HOLMSTRÖM

Among other things the JAS stick regulates the seven external control areas, the nose wings, front and rear flaps and the rudder. Signals from the control stick go via a multichannel electrical system to the electrical servomechanisms that provide mobility to the external control areas



Both the ministick and the new thrust regulator (gas control) have now been patented by Saab. A patent has also been sought for the unique process with the nonlinear steering mode function that gives the stick its special properties.

#### Electronic Transmission

The JAS miniature control stick will control a dozen important functions in the airplane. The movements of the stick regulate the ~~some~~ external control areas: the two nose wings (canards), two front flaps and the rear flaps on the main wings plus the rudder. In addition there are a number of small knobs on the control stick for other functions such as radar and weapons.

#### Steering Modes

The ministick controls the various external control areas according to a computerized system. The program is based on two types of steering mode that determine how steering will be performed.

One type of steering mode gives high sensitivity to large stick movements and low sensitivity to small ones.

The other type of steering mode gives a function with reverse characteristics. A low moment gradient (i.e. a small change in stick pressure) leads to big movements and a high moment gradient leads to fine control movements.

When both types of steering mode are utilized simultaneously, the control stick acquires its special properties. The ministick is said to have nonlinear steering mode functions.

(A traditionally constructed control stick with linear steering mode functions produces a control effect that is in direct proportion to the response of the control stick to movements.)

The hand rests on the rigid lower section of the steering device during all movements of the stick. The hand support provides a reference for the controlling hand, especially important in turns with high G force or in unstable air conditions (turbulence).

#### Stick Force

The stick force that is felt by the hand is produced by mechanical springs and direct moment motors. The moment motors are programmed so that stick forces can be changed. The stick can be moved forward and backward 11 degrees and sideways 8 degrees in each direction from a neutral position.

The precision that the control stick and steering system can produce is up to  $\pm 0.1$  degree in the direction of flight relative to a target or on landing. A very high degree of precision.



The stick and control system make it possible with the help of touch to give the pilot a better idea of the airplane's situation than he can get by just using his eyes. A pilot's hand can detect changes via the control stick as quickly as 10-20 milliseconds. And the control system is that quick too. Normally it takes 100-150 milliseconds for a pilot to react and move the control stick.

6578

CSO: 3650/185

ECONOMIC

DENMARK/GREENLAND

#### LARGE DEPOSIT OF WOLFRAM FOUND ON ISLAND

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG/BLICK DURCH DIE WIRTSCHAFT in German  
25 Jan 85 p 7

[Text] In Greenland prospects are good for the development of mining because of the discovery of wolframite deposits, which were located by the Danish Geological Service of Copenhagen. According to a report in MINING MAGAZINE, the deposits appear to be remarkably widespread and in a favorable logistical position, which is equally remarkable; as a matter of fact they are in the immediate neighborhood of the capital of Godthaab: the largest deposits are only 5 kilometers from the city; all the deposits that have been located to date and pockets in the bedrock (they are numerous and only a small part of them have been tested provisionally) extend along the Godthaab Fjord and the surrounding fjords up to approximately 100 kilometers inland.

The deposits were discovered when cartographic surveys were made of the river sediments of the area, during the process of which the "heavy minerals" of the river sands (ore minerals, most of which are considerably heavier than normal grains of sand, in other words, quartz and feldspar) were analyzed. Following the doubtlessly surprising discovery, an ultraviolet lamp--a prospecting tool used specifically for wolframite minerals--was directed at a few points in the area to search for the wolframite-containing bedrock in the river sands. The sites are two "nephrite formations" which are 3.8 and 3 billion years old respectively and the existence of which has been known for some time.

Wolframite appears in the form of "scheelite," a calcium wolframite, and it can be found in the most interesting stones of green slate, the so-called "amphibolite." The bluish to bluish-white fluorescence shows that this scheelite (in contrast to other sites) may be deficient in molybdenum. Part of the ore minerals appear finely divided, part are in layers parallel to the stratification of the bedrock and part are massive mineral formations in veins.

The bonding of the mineral deposits to strata and the rock of the ore formation show that these deposits have a similar origin similar to those that were discovered at the site of the Alpine mining facility of Mittersill in Austria, which was developed by the "Metallgesellschaft" [Metal Company] into one of the largest facilities of the world: The wolframite may have been the result of suboceanic volcanic eruptions which subsequently settled in deep-sea sediments.

The bonding of wolframite to layered sediments on the bottom of the sea-- although it is very old, many times as old as the wolframite-containing veins of Mittersill--and the widespread occurrences of these layers that are already evident lead to the assumption that the deposits may be sizable. The relative closeness of transportation routes would favor exploitation; this should be of great interest to Greenland, which will soon become independent (at the present time, the fishing industry is practically the only economic basis of the country, aside from nonferrous metal mining of medium-size dimensions and a limited life-span).

8991

CSO: 3620/256

ECONOMIC

GREECE

#### SPECTRUM OF TRADE WITH USSR REVIEWED

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 10 Feb 85 p 32

[Article by Mikh. Papagiannakis]

[Text] As had been noted previously in these columns (TO VIMA, 20 February 1983), Greek-Soviet economic relations continue to have an almost exclusively commercial nature, although some things seem to be changing in the medium-term.

#### Trade Relations

Greek-Soviet trade has increased approximately 50 percent in the last four years.

Greek exports to the USSR were worth 91 million dollars in 1980, approximately 142 million in 1983, and should surpass 150 million in 1984 (110 million for the first nine months).

Greek imports from the USSR were worth 151 million dollars in 1980 and 247 million in 1983. Some decrease is anticipated for 1984 (193 million for the first nine months).

In other words, in this entire period there was a deficit at the Greek side's expense (-60 million dollars in 1980, -257 million in 1981, -79 in 1982, -104 in 1983). Nevertheless, Greek exports covered 60 percent of Greek imports from the USSR in 1980, approximately 22 percent in 1981, approximately 64 percent in 1982 and approximately 58 percent in 1983. This relationship is fairly favorable if compared with the degree that imports are covered by exports in overall Greek foreign trade where, in general, it is somewhat lower than 50 percent.

It should be pointed out that this development in Greek-Soviet trade concerns the period after the abolishment of clearing (which favored almost balanced commercial exchanges) and, therefore, the Greek economy seems to be responding relatively well to the new conditions which certainly have a more "financial" nature.

When we examine the details of this commerce, however, we must point out some problems in the related statistics.

### Strange...Deviations

The same Greek-Soviet commerce, in the same time period, is described in a significantly different way in the Soviet statistics. Thus, while Greek exports to the USSR are given with almost identical magnitudes (in rubles, of course), Soviet exports to Greece are given with huge differences compared to Greek data on Greek imports from the USSR (whereas the two magnitudes normally would have to be almost identical). Thus, the Soviet side gives the following data (in million rubles) on Soviet exports (the Greek data in million dollars in parentheses):

1980	-----	409	(151)
1981	-----	538	(331)
1982	-----	533	(221)
1983	-----	533	(247)
1984	(first nine months)	- 416	(121)

And one should take into consideration that, with the official parity, the ruble is equivalent to more than a dollar.

This difference can in no way be explained by differences in calculating or recording data.

It is clear that certain magnitudes which the Soviets include in their exports to Greece are not included by the Greeks in their imports from the USSR. Of course, many conjectures can be made but it would be better if some official explanation came first....

Let us confine ourselves to presenting and analysing the official Greek data.

### Importance and Composition

Greek-Soviet trade is a minimum percentage of the total Soviet foreign trade. For Greek foreign trade, it represents an important percentage: Greek exports to the USSR represented 3.3 percent of total Greek exports in 1982; this proportion will amount to 2 to 2.5 percent in 1984. In more detail, exports of industrial products to the USSR amounted to 1.6 percent of total Greek industrial exports in 1982, a percentage it is hoped it will be possible to increase soon.

Greece exported to the USSR mainly agricultural products (about 60 percent of its exports). Industrial consumer products (yarns, fabrics, knitted goods) cover more than 10 percent. The remaining exports are composed of various products, mainly bauxite and steel products (pipes, rods) which, to a large extent, are constructed from scrap imported from the USSR.

This composition of Greek exports can be diversified--it is being pursued--so that there will be development of exports of other products, such as shoes (previously they were important, but they snagged on some shipments of poor-quality products), readywear clothing (a very dynamic branch of Greek industry), etc. Diversification is the only way to secure in the long-term a future increase in Greek exports because, already, for various products now being exported the possibilities are being exhausted, or opportunities for exports to other markets with better prices (for example, to the EEC) are presenting themselves.

The USSR exports to Greece mainly oil, wood and scrap, but also cars, machines and certain industrial consumer goods.

Their future development is connected mainly to Greek industrial development in general, and the public sector's procurements in particular, as well as the eventual "materialization" of agreements discussed for many years now concerning creation of joint enterprises in Greece with the analogous transfer of technology which generally entails sales of industrial equipment. From this point on opens the chapter of technical and economic cooperation which surpasses and completes that of the simple commercial relation.

#### Beyond Commerce

This chapter interests, and most probably is advantageous to, both sides. The particular discussions which have seen the light of publicity up to now have not, at any rate, ended in specific accomplishments.

The most advanced negotiation seems to be that concerning the alumina factory which apparently would be in Domvraina, Voiotia, and would have a potential of 600,000 tons a year.

It would be a state enterprise erected with Soviet cooperation. Its production would be absorbed mainly by the USSR (for aluminum production). Up to a few months ago, the related negotiations were going at a remarkable pace despite the fact that serious preliminary work and study has been done by the Greek side.

Certain (very correct) Greek initiatives and negotiating positions have caused some "grumbling" on the Soviet side (recourse to the services of a U.S. adviser, discussion on the technology and prices at which the USSR will buy the product, the Greek side's method of payment for Soviet services, etc.).

It appears, however, that a new phase has opened (perhaps, because of the prime minister's visit, it would be good for something more specific than in the past to be announced) and the procedures are being worked out.

The negotiation concerning the repair and construction of Soviet ships in Greek shipyards also appears to be of interest. The Greek side is interested in long-term agreements which would allow some planning and would protect Greek shipyards from drops in prices internationally. The USSR had accepted this position at the beginning. The specific arrangements and, eventually, the orders remain.

Finally, an older plan is still pending. It concerns purchasing natural gas from the USSR to cover Greek energy requirements. A study has already been written. But the statement of Greek intentions is pending. The pipe (which the Soviets will build up to Greece) will also serve Turkey and will pass through Bulgarian territory. The combination is already "sensitive," even if certain pressures from NATO for reasons of more general policy are ignored, pressures which, nonetheless, other Western European countries have politely ignored.

#### Extrapolate

With the proviso of always unforeseeable surprises, the Greek side appears to be fairly pessimistic about the possibility of there being significant developments on the above issues. It is probably wrong, in the sense that it is not



easy for sensational developments to be obtained in intricate relations of two economies which are themselves complex and differentiated.

It is, at any rate, unquestionable that both the issue of the trade deficit at the Greek side's expense, and the issue of developing technical and economic cooperation, depend more on the Soviet side and less on the Greek side's very real willingness.

#### GREEK-SOVIET COMMERCIAL RELATIONS

<u>Year</u>	<u>Imports from USSR</u> (in million dollars)	<u>Exports to USSR</u>
1980	151	91
1981	331	74
1982	221	142
1983	247	142
1984 (first nine months)	121	110

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#### GREEK EXPORTS TO USSR (in million dollars)

	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>
Tobacco	25.2	33.5
Citrus Fruits	31.1	21.5
(Lemons	21.1	10.1)
Raisins	3.0	4.7
Olive Oil	-	5.7
Fruit Juice	2.3	2.3
Flour	8.2	-
Yarn	1.8	1.6
Fabrics	3.3	10.5
Clothing	0.4	0.8
Bauxite	17.5	16.3
Lead Ore	7.5	2.6
Steel Products	29.0	29.8

9247

CSO: 3521/191

ECONOMIC

GREECE

## INDUSTRIAL, MINING PRODUCTION ROSE IN 1984

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 12 Feb 85 p 17

[Text] A significant increase in the production of mines, industry and electricity was noted in the eleven-month period, January to November 1984, according to data from the Statistical Service publicized yesterday. During this time period, the general production index noted a 2.9-percent increase, while in 1983 it had decreased 0.6 percent and in 1982 it dropped sensationally, 4.2 percent.

This rise in production, stressed qualified functionaries, which is being achieved for the first time in four years, is substantial proof of the recovery of economic activity which is unquestionable.

The recovery of production is clear in all sectors, with emphasis in the production of mines and electricity. A smaller increase is seen in industrial production, where the production of a fair number of branches is stationary.

More specifically, the production index for mines increased in the January-to-November period 20.1 percent, whereas in 1983 it had decreased 8.1 percent and in 1982 had also dropped 4.2 percent. The rise in this index is due to the great increase in production of iron and nickel ores, mining and construction materials, chromium and manganese ores, magnesite and lignite. Conversely, bauxite production decreased 5.7 percent.

In the January-to-November 1984 period, industrial production increased 2 percent, while in the same period in 1983 it had decreased 0.3 percent and, in 1982, 4.9 percent. This trend in industrial production was influenced mainly by the increased production of metallurgic products, chemicals, elastic and plastic products, leather and beverages. Conversely, production of paper, furniture, wood and means of transportation fell.


Electricity and gas production noted a 3.8-percent increase in the eleven-month period of 1984, while in the same period in 1983 it increased 1.4 percent, and in 1982 decreased 0.2 percent.

As concerns the development of production in November, the tendencies in force for the eleven months' average are not refuted by the related data, which are:

1. The general production index increased 2.9 percent.
2. The production index for mines showed an increase, in relation to the same month in 1983, of 33.9 percent.

3. The industrial production index increased 1.8 percent.
4. The electricity-gas production index increased 1.4 percent.

PRODUCTION OF MINES, INDUSTRY, ELECTRICITY-GAS



Key:

- (1) Average Production, January to November
- (2) Electricity-Gas
- (3) Industry
- (4) Mines

9247

OSO: 3521/191

EXCERPT

GREECE

#### OIL EXPLORATION SEEM STABLY INCREASING

Athens MESIMVRI in Greek 9 Feb 85 p. 13

[Article by ANA, Zisisianis]

[Text] Explorations by the Public Petroleum Corporation (DEP) have been downgraded in the last two years, a fact reflected in the yearly expenditures for explorations, which amounted to 2,030 million drachmas in 1983, versus 3,290 million drachmas in 1982 and 2,712 million drachmas in 1981.

In a chosen and frugal program regarding oil explorations, DEP has planned for 1985 to conduct six to eight drillings on land and two to four in the ocean.

The programming and their inclusion in the explorations plan does not mean they will be carried out within the designated time period.

The drilling which will occur on land will cover the areas of Ipeiros, north-western Peloponnese and probably Thessaly. Undersea drillings will be conducted in the Ionian Sea and Thessalonian Gulf.

It is characteristic that the program does not include DEP explorations in areas which probability of oil east of Greece was "questionable" areas of the Aegean. These are the areas for which NATO had formerly called on the ND government of that time to proceed in explorations.... Three years have already passed and these areas have not been explored even though they are considered to probably have oil ...

Explorations which conducted in these areas have ended in the conclusion that, to a large percentage, indications about the existence of oil reserves are many.

[Text] (Continued)

The contradictions, indecisiveness and recantation in the policy of the country's basic agency for petroleum has led DEP to the point of dysfunction at the moment. It is "difficult" to expand the explorations and bear fruits. The production of the Ploimni reserves, which presently yield a maximum of 26,000 barrels a day, is not enough to cover a modest part of the country's oil needs, which amount to 11 billion tons of oil a year.

In his interview, DEP Managing Director Zisisianis, referring to drillings in the Ploimni undersea area, stated that the 18 June 1982 letter of the energy minister to plan the drilling activities imposed suspension of any further activity

by the contractor, aside from those in an advanced stage, until arrangements and negotiations for a mutually-accepted, revised contract could begin and could proceed normally.

#### Foreign Companies

The Denison association, with its 4 November 1982 document, agreed that the minister's letter referred to above was the word of superior force, and that the last operation in an advanced stage at that time was the "Ammodis Z." drilling.

This matter is still pending today....

Especially for the Prinos contract, where Law 98/75 stipulates the contractor has a right to retain 70 percent of the Prinos production during the first five years after production starts for amortization of investments. The remaining 30 percent of production is shared between the parties, at a ratio of 65 percent for the Greek side and 35 percent for the association. After the fifth year, the percentage of amortization falls to 40 percent, and the rest of the production is shared at the same ratios between the two parties, that is, 65 and 35 percent.

As concerns the agreement between the North Aegean Oil Company and ELDA [expansion unknown] for supplying crude oil, a contract had been signed on 24 May 1984, with an operative starting date of 1 July 1984 and an 18-months duration.

The price is competitive, specifically with the prices of other Eastern Mediterranean crude oils, taking quality into account. On this basis, EPVA [expansion unknown] and Aspropyrgos Refineries have agreed on a formula designating at any moment the price of crude oil analogous to the prices of parameters intruding on the formula.

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CSO: 3521/191

ENERGY

SWEDEN

BRIEFS

OIL SEARCH ON GOTLAND--The search for oil on Gotland continues. During 1985 the semi-governmental OPAB will drill approximately 15 new wells on the island. Besides, probes done in the outer Hano Bay are now being evaluated. OPAB produced about 14,500 cubic meters of oil in the year 1984. Gross sales are around 17 billion kronor and profits at about 2 billion kronor before balancing the books and taxation. "And these are approximately the same figures and production volumes we have had since 1982," confirms Stig Adamsson, chief administrator of OPAB. OPAB today has 28 wells in production at 14 different sites. Every day they pump out about 60 cubic meters of oil. The wellsite lies in Gotland's northeastern region in the vicinity of Rute Church. [Text] [Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 12 Jan 85 p 27] 12723

CSO: 3650/147



ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

SWEDEN

COMMUNIST MP, INDUSTRY SPOKESMAN CRITICIZES ENVIRONMENT BILL

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 27 Feb 85 p 6

[Text] "The actions have been started too late and have a too restricted content," said VPK [Communist Left Party] Deputy Chairman Viola Claesson in a commentary on the government's pollution bill.

He pointed out that the proposed measures will not give any concrete results until six years later than what would be the case according to the VPK action plan against forest death and pollution.

"The government's package seems to be more suited to pacify the fear of the automotive industry held in other European countries," said Claesson. The government is also afraid to force through those measures directed against Swedish big industry.

The Industry Confederation believes that those measures which the government is proposing will be too expensive in relation to effects on the environment.

"The proposed measures designed to reduce by half the sulfur emissions of industrial sulfur emissions are estimated to reduce the acid-rain precipitation over Sweden by only one percent," said Ann-Charlotte Plogner of the Industry Confederation.

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